Valparaiso University

ValpoScholar
The Cresset (archived issues)
5-1972

The Cresset (Vol. XXXV, No. 7)
Valparaiso University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/cresset_archive
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public
Administration Commons
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
The Cresset (archived issues) by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please
contact a ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu.

May, 1972

THE CRESSET
a rev1ew of literature, the arts, and

public affairs

In Luce Tua

By DON A. AFFELDT

Comment on Current Issues

On Being Rendered Unto CHsar
The Aprill7 income tax deadline has passed, but the
painful wound inflicted upon our checkbooks, savings
accounts, or household budgets still stings. Most of us
are willing to "render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's." But
some of us also wonder: "Shouldn't something remain
to be rendered unto us?"
The complaint is overstated, to be sure. Between the
standard or itemized deductions and the adjusted net
tax liability, something remains to be spent by the wageearner. But increasingly he is wondering: "Is enough
left? Am I paying too much in taxes?"
There is never enough left, no matter how much one
earns or how little one pays in taxes. Whatever there is
left can easily be spent with only a half-hearted effort;
and if not spent, then saved against the future or for
the sake of one's heirs. Increasingly, however, taxpayers are discovering that their net income doesn't
stretch far enough to cover fixed expenses or reasonable
and necessary outlays. With the hidden loss to inflation
and the obvious spiraling tax-rate, persons on fixed incomes are rapidly losing ground. The very many others
on nearly-fixed incomes are faring almost as badly.
The question whether one is paying too much tax is
more difficult to answer. Like the term "enough," the
phrase "too much" is relative - too much with respeFt
to what, compared to whom, and on what basis is the
judgment made?
The most cpmmon complaint is that one is paying
more money, in dollar amounts or in percentage of
income, than someone else who either is in roughly the
same situation as the first man - except for his taxes or else is in a much better situation even though he pays
roughly the same amount of taxes as the first man. The
problem here is one of equity or fairness in bearing
whatever tax burden must be borne by tax-paying citizens.
There is no denying that the taxing practices of the
United States result in some gross and many minor
inequities between tax-payers. Milton Friedman recently noted that two salaried persons cohabiting paid much
less in taxes than would the same two persons had they
been legally married. Similarly, renters may not deduct
from their income the portion of their rent which goes
for property tax, though home owners can, even though
the cost is passed on to the renter. And we have all
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heard of the millionaires who through one exemption
or another escape tax liability altogether, while families
near the poverty line find precious dollars drained
from their paychecks by the government.
The obvious solution to problems of inequity is to
"close the loopholes" which create them. One should
note, though, that loopholes also have another name:
incentives. If renters, but not owners, received deductions for property taxes, fewer rental units would be
built and rents on existing units would be hiked. This
would probably result in an absolute shortage of housing - a social problem - as well as a decline in the construction industry - an economic problem.
Or, if the rich who shelter their plenty in tax-free
municipal bonds were taxed on their earnings, low-interest municipal bonds would lose their attractiveness.
The result might be that those with money to invest
would not buy the bonds - thus cutting off a prime
source of funds for civic improvements - or property
taxes would be increased to cover the higher interest
rates on the bonds. In either case, it is questionable
whether the beleagured average taxpayer would be any
the better off for the change.
Similarly, tax credits to corporations strike many
citizens as unfair favoritism. But tax credits have uses
which benefit everyone. They provide an effective,
speedy method of tinkering with the economy when
help is needed in some sectors. And they have the special virtue of being able to influence corporations to
adopt useful but expensive modifications of their practices- in pollution abatement, for example - without
reliance on elaborate, expensive, and time-consuming
enforcement procedures.
Even so, there remain loopholes in our tax laws which
benefit only the special interests who managed to get
favored consideration when the laws were enacted.
These exemptions, amounting to outright subsidy for
socially unnecessary goods or services, are the source
of the genuine inequities in our tax structure. As a general principle, it seems plain that no one is entitled to
special consideration just because he has the know-how
or know-who to arrange it for himself. Exemptions
should be granted only upon a showing of clear desert.
Generalities aside, the tough question is which of the
favored groups or persons deserve the generous treatment they are receiving?
Here the question shifts from one of equity to one of
value. The value question has two aspects; personal and
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social. The personal question might be put in this way:
"Am I getting my money's worth for the taxes I pay?"
The social question: "Is the society benefitting from my
services roughly in accordance with the net income I
extract from society?"
I have no doubt that there is a way to answer such
questions "in economic terms" via the sophisticated
statistical techniques of present-day economics. The
answers, whatever they are, would no doubt be illuminating- about the economy, and about one's own
function in it as a pea-sized ball-bearing in a machine of
several billion moving parts. But these questions are
not exclusively economic questions. Anyone who thinks
they are has no hope of understanding the widespread
unrest in our country over the tax laws. And, on a deeper level, he could not understand one of the factors most
crucial in determining the happiness of individuals in
society and the health of the society as a whole.
I am saying that these are not strictly economic questions. So saying, however, I enormously complicate
questions which are difficult enough to deal with even
in strictly economic terms. For example, expenditures
for "defense" presumably defend everyone alike, rich
and poor. But generally the poor man pays less (in dollar amount) than the rich man does for the same "amount"
of defense. The welfare-recipient pays little or nothing
in taxes yet receives cash subsidies from the state; the
middle-income citizen pays a fair amount to fund welfare programs, yet receives no direct return at all for
his money. A cliff-dweller in Manhattan may pay as
much for super-highway subsidies as does the (real)
cliff-dweller in Arizona; yet the latter may use the new
roads extensively, whereas the former never leaves the
city.
But even if it could be demonstrated - which it
demonstrably could not be - that each of us alike receives approximately the same amount in dollar value
of governmental goods and services as we individually
pay in taxes, the value-question would still be asked.
Then it would be a question of whether these goods and
services haw~ that value to me. "So I got $8.45 worth of
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moon-shot from my 1971 taxes. So what? I didn't want
Sit worth of moon-shot! I would much rather have gone
to three movies with that $8.45, instead of watching
about a half-hour of not-very-exciting television during
the moon-shots!"
This, I think, is the heart of the current political
problem regarding taxation. Some people simply cannot maintain their standard of living in the face of rising taxes; but many people are not convinced that their
tax dollars are being spent for goods and services they
want. The preferences vary widely, as we might expect.
Some citizens begrudge even a penny of their tax dollars spent by the pentagon, while others begrudge every
penny spent by anyone other than the pentagon. And so
it goes. The only agreement is that a lot of everybody's
tax dollar is being spent on something which he thinks
is unnecessary, or at least less valuable to him than would
be some other expenditure - or j1,1st simply letting him
keep more of the money in the first place.
There is perhaps no total solution to this problem. If
even husbands and wives are known for regular and
sharp disagreement on allocations of family income,
how can we hope that over 200 million citizens should
find accord in the dispensation of the public purse?
One speculates that such domestic accord as there is in
this country is due in no small measure to general ignorance of the details of public expenditures. If we knew
where all that money went, there would be domestic
hell to pay.
One partial solution to public disenchantment with
governmental resource-allocation does recommend itself, however. That would be to give each citizen a direct say in the distribution of some part of his tax dollar.
For this purpose, the national budget would probably
have to be divided into two categories: necessary expenditures and contingent expenditures.
For simplicity's sake, let us suppose that in planning
the budget for the next fiscal year, the government were
to assume that all current expenditures are indeed necessary. We further suppose that the budget-makers propose increments in those broad categories (such as de-
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fense, health care, recreation areas, welfare, education,
etc.) in which additional expenditures seem most useful. Then, in filling out his tax form, the taxpayer would
be invited to designate one or more of these categories
to which his prorated excess tax monies would be allocated. Then, if education (say) received any of the desired increase, its budget could be raised accordingly.
If it did not, no increase for education would appear in
the next government budget.
Modifications of this proposal are doubtless required
to facilitate planning, to avoid gross surpluses in some
areas while other areas go begging, and to provide for
congressional designation of funds for areas where
"usefulness" has become "necessity" in spite of public
disinterest. And if economic growth fails to generate
more tax dollars, levies would need to 'be raised even
though the destination of the funds remained unknown.
But these complications seem solvable in principle,
and in any case I wish only to add a word or two about
the advantages of the proposal.
First, it would give the taxpayer the justified feeling
that. a considerable portion of his tax dollar was being
spent precisely the way he wanted it spent. This would
give hawks and doves, liberals and conservatives, cranks
and cosmopolitans alike a chance for some gratification
when tax bills fall due. Only the miser is denied pleasure.
Second, the proposal would democritize government
precisely at the point where it most matters: determining who gets what. Socially inventive programs would
be encouraged, for the people would decide whether or

not they were to be funded, and to what extent. Socially
unpopular programs, on the other hand, could be
speedily eliminated in the "tax vote" - provided they
were not so locked into "necessary expenditures" that
they never came up for the tax-vote.
In sum, the proposal promises to bring key governmental decisions before the public for yearly review in
a manner more graphic and telling than any vote for
"middle of the road" candidates - the only electable
ones .- could ever do.
The second question I mentioned - that of the value
to society of one's paid services - is equally complex.
Since I treated the questionin individual terms in these
pages a year ago, let me say now only that the question
needs asking especially with respect to corporate taxes.
Does the corporate tax structure truly reflect the differential value of corporations to the economy, or to
the society as a whole? A Harold Geneen of ITT earning in excess of a million dollars a year in salary tempts
us to conclude quickly that corporate taxes need revising. The question clearly needs careful discussion, but
I would argue that not every product (and hence not
every company) has equal economic or social utility.
Thus some should be taxed more heavily than others analogously, perhaps, to the graduated personal income
tax.
Being rendered unto Caesar is painful enough when
only the fat is burnt off. But increasingly the flesh is
being burned. American taxpayers deserve better of
their government.

On Second Thought
Theology, like any other human activity, twists and
squirms to escape the burden of the grace of God. It is
more successful in the attempt than most other methods,
because its category allows it to use the language of
God and grace while escaping.
We do not want the burden of a universal judgment,
that there is no moral difference between us. Theology
permits us to picture a god who distinguishes between
the good man and the bad man, and punishes those who
disagree with us. We do not want the burden of absolute
grace with no merit or worthiness in us. Theology, paying lip service to the truth, yet restricts the grace of
God. We must believe the proper truths, we must confess the major sins, we must respond with proper trust
before the grace can operate. More particularly, we
must avoid the evils currently decried by the theologian for which, he says, there is no grace.
Against God's climactic Word of judgment and grace,
Jesus Christ, theology has been most effective. Because
May, 1972

we could not stand that Word, we took Him out and
killed Him. And theologians have ever since studied
to define the act in order to reduce or avoid the guilt.
They have said that God's law required the sacrifice,
and we acted as agents in the necessary rite. They have
said that proud people killed Him, but we and our kind
profit in imputed innocence. They have said that He
did not need to die, we now understand and obey His
word and would never kill Him. They have even dared
to do battle with one another, testing which brand of
theology most successfully escapes the burden of the
guilt. The success is wealth and numbers, the flocking
of the crowds to those hymns and prayers which most
easily leave us unchanged by grace.
The Pharisee no longer stands in the temple and
prays "I thank Thee, God ... "His stance has changed.
He now stands in the classroom and the public assembly
to explain with ornate theology why he is different.
But the publican still stands in the shadow saying "God
be merciful to me, a sinner."
5

In Luce Tua II
Guest Comment on Current Issues
On the Politics of Pot
It is neither new nor particularly startling to note
that countless millions of white, middle-class, young
people in the United States use or have at one time used
marihuana. Public responses to "pot smoking" vary
widely from advocating severe prison sentences to offering extensive drug education programs and establishing local clinics to provide medical care for those
on "bad trips." While the hard line incarceration advocates see such measures as effective in repressing drug
use, the more "enlightened" recent response has been
to suggest that the drug be decriminalized and treated
as a community "social problem."
This latter approach is taken by the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, whose members unanimously advocated in their final report that
all criminal penalties be eliminated for the private use
and personal possession of marihuana. Though the
Commission in its recommendations suggested that
some penalties remain for pushing and public consumption, the trend and gist of the report is clear: personal
marihuana use should no longer be a concern of the
agents of social control in this society. It is a "crime
without a victim."
What makes all this current flurry of activity over the
presence of pot in American society disheartening is
that the "concern" has arisen only when its effects have
been felt in the more affluent strata. For those familiar
with the slums and poverty. stricken black areas of our
cities, the presence of pot is neither new nor uncommon. As Claude Brown noted in Manchild in the Promised Land, the use of marihuana was an integral part
of his youthful life of the streets of Harlem in the 1940's.
Yet no national commission was formed to study the
impact and consequences of drugs on the community
and life of the poor blacks, or better yet, study why
the urban black sought the use of drugs.
It should be noted that the present Presidential Commission concerned itself solely with the issue of marihuana use and abuse. The more fundamental dilemma
which remains to confront the nation revolves around
the destructive force of "hard" drugs - heroin and
cocain, for example. If the past be any v;uide, it is doubtful that the consequences of hard drugs on the fabric
of this society will be examined until such drugs begin
to creep out of the confines of the ghettos and appear
in suburban and affluent areas.
The "containment approach" toward hard drugs
succeeds only so long as stringent patrol and supervision of the central city black communities are continued. One of the many consequences of the white com-
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munity's attempt to protect itself from the ravaging
effects of hard drugs has been its willingness to condone the drug exploitation of the black community.
So long as the legal consequences of marihuana use
could be safely avoided by the affluent, it was acceptable to allow decisions on its regulation to be made by
"experts" rather than the community which is supposedly threatened. But with the movement of marihuana
into the zones of affluence, it no longer suffices to allow outside experts to dictate social policy.
In 1937 the United States Congress first passed legislation designed to eradicate the use of marihuana in
this nation. The process whereby marihuana became
defined as illegal was one where a particular set of values
was elevated into law that carried the sanctions of the
state. But the massive curr-ent disregard for the marihuana drug laws by young, affluent whites presents a
fundamental political protest against the very legitimacy of those laws. A democratic political system cannot exist through the stringent use of force and fear.
For the system to maintain its legitimacy, the laws that
are passed must have sufficient acceptance among the
citizens so that voluntary compliance follows.
If one recognizes that the vast majority of black people in this country have existed as an internal colonial
people, it becomes clear why white law-makers have
been able to disregard the needs of the black community. The current concern over the presence of drugs has
come only when the threat emerged to .the legitimacy
of the power brokers within the white community. So
long as the "law and order" approach was sufficient for
the treatment of the drug users within the black community, whites could remain complacent. In this instance, the presence of law has not insured justice, but
only the perpetuation of injustice.
Colonized blacks do not represent a threat to the
system so long as they are securely confined to their
ghettoes. But with young whites such confinement is
not possible. Thus a political response is necessary to
perpetuate the current systems of power. When President Nixon established the National Commission on
Marihuana and Drug Abuse in 1970, he indicated tnat
if the Commission recommended the decriminalization
of marihuana, he would reject the recommendations.
But believing him to be a pragmatic man in an election
year, it will be interesting to see if he keeps his word.

By RAY C. RIST

Assistant Professor of Sociology
Portland State University
Portland, Oregon
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The Meaning of Liberation
An Essay in Psychology and Politics
By CHARLES WHITMAN
Staff Writer in Divinity and Philosophy
Enc yclopaedia Britannica
Chicago, 11/inois

Lib-er-ate. 1. To give liberty to; set free , especially to
free (a country )from foreign control. 2. Chemistry. To
release from combination, as a gas. 3. Military Slang. To
obtain by looting. (Latin liberare, from liber, free . )
American Heritage Dictionary.
The Dictionary of American Slang. Liberate : to steal.
To have sex ual intercourse with, or take as a mistress,
a g irl native to an occupied country. World War II
Army use in Europe.
A Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English
(E. Partridge~ Liberate. To gain illicitly or deviously;
to steal: Army: 1944 (Italy ) and 1945 (Germany ~ By
humorous euphemism.
Familiar Quotations (J. Bartlett~ "We sure liberated
the hell out of this place." (American soldier in the ruins
of a French village, 1944; quoted by Max Miller, The
Far Shore, 1945~
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. Free . Sy n :
liberate implies a setting at liberty, not only of a person under restraint, but a person or thing attached in
some way to another.
The New Language of Politics (W. Safire, 1968~
"Liberation of captive peoples - the promise of the
Republican platform of 1952 and subsequently of the
Eisenhower administration that the U.S. would help the
people of the countries under communist rule gain
their freedom. " . . . "fohn Foster Dulles told a Senate
committee that 'liberation does not mean a war of liberation."' (pp . 232-33)
"Ob viously , the meaning of the phrase depends on
who is using it. Abraham Lincoln illustrated this dilem ma in 1864: 'The shepherd drives the wolf from the
sheep 's throat, for which the sheep thanks the shepherd
as his liberator, while the wolf denounces him for the
same act as the destroyer of liberty."' (p. 478)
Henry David Thoreau in A Plea for Captain John
Brown: "I speak for the slave when I say that I prefer
the philanthropy of Cap tam Brown to that philanthropy
which neither shoots nor liberates me. " (Bartlett)
The Oxford English Dictionary amplifies liberare:
"to deliver." (As in: he doesn 't deliver on his promises
. . . deliver us from . . . delivery system. .. free home
delivery . .. delivery ward. . . ) But what does it mean to
be liberated? What has freedom to do with responsibility (response-ability)? Can any one be "free"? How
so? And from what; for what? In A Name for Ourselves,
former SDS president (1964) Paul Potter defines the
state of love in terms of being "whole and free ." Perhaps
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the two define each other: being free . means being
whole. But what does that mean?
Dictionaries differ, and "liberation" has a mixed
connotation-reputation. The gamut of the topic runs
from slavery to anarchy. What do liberation movements
want? Many listeners doubt that they have been clearly
told.

c;/Kate, Norman, and the Rest of Us
All was relatively quiet on the western liberation
front after suffragettes garnered extended civil rights
until Kate Millett published Sexual Politics in 1970.
Betty Friedan's best-seller, The Feminine Mystique
(1963), was tame by comparison. Millett rode the talkshow circuit, was damned and praised by reviewers,
and ushered women into the movement in droves. But
now Gloria Steinem, editor of the new magazime Ms. ,
shares the spotlight with "Germaine Greer, the other
highly visible feminist." (Chicago Daily News, 1/22/72)
Millett's demise was in part the doing of The Prisoner
of Sex, Norman Mailer, whose book exposes the literary
and academic follies of Sexual Politics.
Despite his florid prose Mailer's indictment comes
across with clarity and a vengeance. Focussing on
Millett's use of the ellipsis and out-of-context quotation
of such authors as D. H. Lawrence and Henry Miller,
he shows how she distorts fiction that treats women as
people into fiction that threats them as things, with
male characters as the culprits. ("Do you enjoy reading
Henry Miller?" was later a question on the male-chauvinist-pig test in the Village Voice - cf. Cudlippe, p.
180). Mailer quotes Millett in tandem with several
authors to show that she has altered the facts of fiction
in her quest for male chauvinism. Mailer, of course, is
a self-confessed archprisoner of sex who says women
should be satisfied to stay home and wash dishes. Nevertheless, he contributed to liberation of both men and
women by illuminating dark rhetorical corners, by
calling plays as he saw them, by making clear that pot
shots aimed at imaginary enemies aren't worth firing.
With me it happened this way: at a conference of midwest anti-war groups in Milwaukee in July 1970, I
tangled with a young woman over her stress on the demeaning nature of that corporation habit in which executives coax coffee from flunkies mistakenly titled "sec-
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retaries." (How 'bout a little coffee, eh Valerie?... Ah,
beautiful! You're a doll!) We had been discussing political strategies for corporations generally when the
question of women's roles came up, and I said: "I hope
you have a sense of priorities such that all of your
energy won't go into strategies for eliminating symptoms
of oppression like bringing boss his coffee when goals
like equal-pay-for-equal-work don't get enough attention as it is."
The display of fireworks that followed was without
precedent in pyrotechnical history. For the next halfhour I was berated by every woman in the room. I
protested I had been misunderstood; it was a pragmatic
comment, I said - not a chauvinist one. Undoubtedly,
I did say chauvinist things after the sparks began to
fly - because I was angry. Of course, I had seen it work
both ways: men not comprehending women's anger,
women not comprehending men's anger. But for a time
I was sufficiently cowed to keep silence, and whenever
Women's Liberation confronted me, I suppressed all
reactions - "chauvinist" or otherwise. One episode
involved a male friend's reference to certain unnamed
women as "gals" in the presence of a woman. After she
objected, he changed to "ladies." But that wasn't good
enough (in fact, it was worse), and the woman reneged
on her intention to sign a check as a contribution for an
anti-war project.

cJlhe Scarlet 11A" and Crimson
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And then I came to my senses, beginning with memories of women oppressing me, using me, exploiting me.
To women who damned me on sight as a chauvinist, I
recalled my own oppression at the hands of women.
Sometimes my response resembled the reaction older
men often voice these days: "She runs the house, dotes
on the kids, spends my money, smashes the car, watches
television all day, wants to be taken out for dinner when
I drag myself over the threshhold of the house I'm paying for, and on top of everything else wants a mink coat
and a Cadillac!" Who's oppressing whom? I wondered.
Wasn't the pot calling the kettle black? After all, for
every cartoon of the wife ramming the rear of the garage
with the family Barracuda, there's one that maligns
hubby as do-it-yourself plumber, standing in three
feet of water with Woman perched supremely on the
upper basement stairs casting down aspersions. Both
caricatures are American institutions, both portray
emasculation. But I, having been intimidated by the
sheep in wolf's clothing, became the sheep myself.
Women now had vim, vigor, and . .. virility; feminists
were behaving like "men." Yet because I was cast in
their own former role, I learned what it was like. And
then, without ever having been a supermasculine
machismoistwolfmyself, I passed through my six-month
purgatory of mea-culpa penitence and emerged with
insight into liberation and socialized roles.
All of us in those days - days of "Heartbreak Hotel"
8

and "Mr. Sandman, bring me a dream/Make him the
cutest that I've ever seen!" - all of us had been playing
roles. I came to see that men and women were both
oppressed (as are gays and straights); analogies to the
black movement became appropriate: just as blacks
won't be free until whites are, so women won't be free
until men are. Naturally, there were also women who
participated in the same phenomenon that whites sometimes charged to blacks: reverse racism. In other words,
female chauvinism. And there were the militant feminists who agreed with Leni Wildflower: "What is most
real in my life is my hatred for men - all men." (Potter,
Preface) Indeed, struggles for equality easily become
struggles for supremacy.
Then, too, women developed their own counterpart
to the black insistence that whites "get out" of "their"
movement. (What am I going to "get out" of the women's
movement? - myself!) Both Wildflower and those
homosexuals who profess hatred for straights recall that
soldier's "We sure liberated the hell out of this place."
To Anne Koedt's derisive "Some Male Responses"
(Morgan, pp. 254-55) I preferred Cudlippe: "Out of
this confusion, one fact is clear. Just as there are degrees
to women's liberation, there are degrees to male chauvinism. Just as women are not sure of what women's
liberation is or can be, men are just as unsure of how to
combat chauvinism, which they, like women, can't define with full clarity." (p. 184) Or, as Dana Densmore
wrote, "I think we will learn more about the origins of
sexism, and what role men will play in the revolution
that will destroy it, by watching how men deal with our
call for liberation than by setting up a priori categories
of enemy and ally." (Stambler, p. 47). Otherwise, women
get the male backlash (and homosexuals, the straight
backlash): "All women are sexists! Manhaters! And
(whisper pejoratively) lesbians!" The name of the game
becomes one-upmanship -or one-upwomanship; one
plays at playing roles. The scarlet "A" worn by women,
newly angry, is turned inside out to show a crimson "C"
emblazoned on the breasts of men - and men too turn
to anger. But anger can only be a stage in liberation,
it cannot be the destination.
To escape such a spiral of charge and counter-charge,
to obtain my freedom from the bondage of roles, I
emerged not as a wolf in sheep's clothing - which would
be an insincere effort to masquerade as a "transvestite"
- but determined to "take it all off." I hoped neither to
revert to earlier roles, nor to don the symbols of a stereotyped gender, but to embrace an absence of any deliberate masculinity /femininity. For transvestitism is
liberation only if genuine; but transvestitism as an attempt to assume unfelt roles in order to satisfy social
demands is fraudulent crossdressing; it is transvestitism
squared, multiplied by itself. Whatever it means to be
liberated, I found it necessary to break down imitations
of social gods, to condone sexual iconoclasm, to abolish
gender-distinguished roles. To seek instead to encounter
persons. And, ala Mailer, to expose contorted arguments.
The Cresset

~Gay Liberation and Textual Criticism
Women's Liberation and Gay Liberation intersect
psychologically and politically; the lesbian personifies
the intersection. Viewing them together highlights the
central issue : sexism, or the reduction of persons to
sexual aspects. Michael Durham declares: "To keep
their liberation movement going, militants must present homosexuality as a normal, healthy, even desirable
form of sexual outlet." (That is not true; laws are supposed to protect minorities whether or not their sexual
outlets are "normal," and Gay Liberation need present
itself only as an organization of people, of citizens, to
keep going.) But Durham continues, "Yet there is endless dispute among doctors whether this point of view is
sound." Here he is right - but what is the nature of
the dispute?
One of these doctors, Evelyn Hooker, wrote a paper
in 1956 called "The Adjustment of the Male Overt
Homosexual" that, according to Durham, "made her a
folk hero to the liberation movement." In 1971 Arno
Karlen's Sexuaiity and Homosexuality : A New View was
published in a jacket touting it as "The definitive explanation of human sexuality, normal and abnormal."
This blurb, together with the book's bulk (650 pages)
and an excellent annotated bibliography, make it a
formidable work. More significantly, Karlen's disagreement with Hooker is in the crucial area of psychological
health, the fulcrum of Gay Liberation. Though such
homophile causes as military service and employment
security have been on the agenda for decades, the introduction of psychological health into the debate renders Gay Lib, unlike Women's Lib, a m6vement without
precedent.
In his chapter "Cure or Illusion" (see footnote) , Karlen writes of Hooker: "She suggested that homosexuality as a clinical entity does not exist. .. " But Hooker
actually wrote: "What are the psychological implications
of the hypothesis that homosexuality is not necessarily
a symptom of pathology? I would very tentatively suggest the following: 1. Homosexuality as a clinical entity
does not exist. Its forms are as varied as are those of
heterosexuality." (p. 160) Karlen not only fails to italicize "very tentatively" but omits the phrase entirely,
thus making her conclusions appear more final than
she intended them to be.
What's more, she also wrote : "It comes as no surprise
that some homosexuals are severely disturbed , and,
indeed, so much so that the hypothesis might be entertained that the homosexuality is the defense against
open psychosis." (p. 159) Now measure Karlen's passage,
quoted in the footnote to this essay, against Hooker's
words, continuing from "psychosis":
But what is difficult to accept (for most clinicians ) is that some
homosexuals may be very ordinary individuals , indistinguishable ,
except in sexual pattern. from ordinary individuals who are heterosexuals. Or - and I do not know whether thi s would be more or
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less difficult to accept - that some may be quite superior individuals, not only devoid of pathology (unless one insists that homosexuality itself is a sign of pathology ) but also functioning at a
superior level.
But before we accept this hypothesis as a plausible one, we must
look carefully at the limitations of the evidence. (p. 159 )

Here Karlen fails to italicize her words "may"; he doesn't
include "may be" in his quotation when he could have
done so easily; he omits her sentence about "hypothesis." In short, he excludes all of her references to the
provisional nature of her findings. For what reason
might he have exaggerated Hooker's rigidity as a
theorist, if not to set up a straw man (woman)? Could he
be trying to denigrate the "folk hero"? Ironically, her
own words make her less fitting a folk hero than Karlen's distortion. To a lesser degree, he also distorts
Martin Hoffman's The Gay World by way of paraphrase ; his deception is conceivably habitual and possibly deliberate. But with regard to Hooker, he has
clearly taken exception to things she never said, and
one cannot help wondering why he has put words in
her mouth - or taken them out - especially when his
own conclusions are as tentative as ·hers were fifteen
years earlier.
Karlen does write: "It is equally indefensible for
psychiatrists to argue that, despite every evidence of
general adjustment, a homosexual is sick." But this
seems to be merely a facile concession designed to
balance his view of the Freudian dictum (see footnote);
indeed, it contrasts sharply with his attitude toward
Hooker. If we ask why this might be "indefensible,"
we will be easily drawn by his phrase "general adjustment" into answering precisely in terms of that Freudian
dictum about "the ability to love and to work." And
why not, Gay Liberation will inquire, take that dictum
"literally"? Why not say that until a person is "subjected to certain stresses," he is healthy? Why count him
(or her) among the "sickest," who "never go for treatment"? It is not, Gay Liberation will contend, the idea
of psychological health that is nebulous, but the presentations by such careless authors as Karlen that are
nebulous. Karlen appears to want it both ways, calling
the idea of psychological health "nebulous" in order
to call even the well-adjusted "some of the sickest."
The response of Gay Liberation generally is not only
to say "you can't have it both ways," but also, as Durham
writes, to be ''wary of psychiatry" altogether. "A whole
segment of the liberation movement," he says, "argues
that homosexuals' main goals should be ridding themselves of guilt and self-disdain." Life itself, then, provides a working definition of psychological health very
similar to Freud's dictum.
Karlen's book is at best a definitive survey of various
"explanations" that shows how little can be concluded
definitively about either sexuality or homosexuality.
Essentially, it confirms the gist of Hooker's research.
Though neither Karlen nor Hooker "conclude" anything with finality, her tentative hypothesis is one he
might accept: "That homosexuality is determined by a
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multiplicity of factors would not now, I think, be seriously questioned. That the personality structure and
adjustment may also vary within a wide range now seems
quite clear." That was in 1956; Karlen's work shows how
little has changed. Nowhere has Hooker's view seemed
more plausible to me than at several meetings of a Gay
Liberation-sponsored "Consciousness Group on Bisexuality" that I visited in the winter of 1972. That nothing
definitive could be said - or was said there - either
about etiology or about life styles - would be an understatement; very little can be said at all.
Whether social attitudes against homosexuality feed
psychiatric oppression or vice-versa is a chicken-andegg question. But Gay Liberation, regardless of faction,
opposes both social proscription and psychiatric paternalism. Like women who object to put-downs by certain psychologists (see Dr. Naomi Weisstein's criticism
of Dr. Bruno Bettelheim in "Kinde, Kuche, Kirche";
Morgan, p. 206ff. ), homosexuals are resisting classifications and derogations that overstep the bounds of
Hooker's wide-ranging hypothesis. The issue of psychological health has come to resemble the question of
addiction to marijuana. Despite fervent disputes over
"physiological dependency" and addiction, life itself
provides the working definitions : there are millions of
pot-smokers, and we have heard nothing to make us
believe otherwise than that the vast majority are alive
and well - and liberated. The same liberation - from
an equally complex and befuddled debate, and from the
notions of "experts" whether professionals or laymen is a major goal of Gay Liberation.

c/Psychology, Politics, and Mutualist Anarchy
For everything there is a season, and a time for every
matter under heaven. Among other things, a time for
psychology and a time for politics. And a time for both.
In an essay reprinted in Irving Horowitz' The Anarchists, British critic and historian Sir Herbert Read
expounded his concept of "mutualist anarchy." Anarchy
need not imply uncertainty and disorder; according to
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, Pierre Proudhon
(1809-65), "Father of Anarchism, advocated a social
organization based on common ownership and free
agreements." That comes close to the spirit of Sir Herbert's essay and to total liberation. Mutualist anarchy
means involvement, mutuality, exchange, engagement.
It expresses essentially what it means to be engage in
an existentialist framework. It means Hegelian thesis/
antithesis/synthesis. It means mutual respect for others'
positions - but also mutual criticism, and thence mutual resolution. It means not only picking up someone
who's down, nor knocking down someone who's up, but
both. As I said to a friend, I want you to love me and
I want you to fight me - then we'll both be free. (Braver
Lutherans may even see seeds of a Law and Gospel dialectic here.) By means of interaction, escalating toward
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the truth at fever pitch, mutual anarchists can arrive
at free agreements. Thus mutualist anarchy is both a
method and a model that organizes the meaning of liberation.
The essential meaning of freedom is the freedom to
determine what freedom means. That is no more tautologous than "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself." This basic meaning is one we begin with, one we
take for granted in order to proceed with other questions. We begin amid a preexisting climate of mutualist
anarchy. Liberation movements - whatever else they
may say - seek to determine what freedom means. At
times, of course, this includes determining the prior
freedom - for political and psychological impediments
are often imposed. But primarily they are at work defining themselves (thesis), producing reactions from the
larger society to their proposals for program and policy
(antithesis), and awaiting the resolution (synthesis).
Mutualist anarchy is "live and let live" - but not in
isolation, not in, insularity, not in benign neglect; instead in intentional tension. It is an antidote to laissezfaire individualism.
The interaction of liberation movements with the
larger society means engagement in three specific
realms: between psychology and politics; between persons "liberated" and otherwise; and between persons
and institutions.
When the assumption is made in advance that psychology and politics do not touch, they can never be
integrated. Yet liberation from others is the opposite
side of liberation from self; merely flip the coin. Roles
are extrinsic/intrinsic. Every cameo has its intaglio.
Bruno Bettelheim shows what psychology can do when
it does not recognize politics as legitimate, in his Realities article "Redundant Youth" (12/70). He refers to
Marshall Bloom, founder of Liberation News Service,
who committed suicide at 25 in 1969:
Being a moral person he assiduously searched for what was wrong ;
and when he found it in himself. he drew tragically the ultimate
conclusion. It need not have been so. If he had not been supported
by his friends and public spokesmen who preach violence, who do
not see that personal unhappiness causes student revolt, he might
have sought help , and with it brought inner peace to his soul.

Such psychological reductionism ("personal unhappiness causes student revolt") does not permit politics a
place; social evil does not exist; no other cause for protest exists except psychopathology. Peter Fisher, a
homosexual, criticizes similar attitudes in The Gay Mystique.
At the other end, an opposing prejudice says politics
is supreme; some (not all) Weathermen exemplify it.
One need only change "the system," "the power structure," "the ruling elite," and need pay no attention to
social attitudes that manifest psychological predispositions, or to one's own self-image, or to liberation from
psychiatric oppression. Liberation movements are at
their best when they have a heightened awareness of the
interplay between psychological and political factors.
TheCresset

But when external life is severed from internal life,
growth and freedom are stunted. One friend wrote me
last year: "the intensity of overt political activity erodes
the spirit and keeps people apart." He continued:
"Don't you think that every male-defined institution
. . . begins to erode us psychologically in very similar
ways as it does women? I have been thinking very much
of my entire past, everything that has molded me towards power and functional-mindedness, away from
love and feeling." That is a persuasive statement. Yet
"the emotional deadliness" of male-defined institutions
need not mean avoiding political encounters. That was
the central activist dilemma during the sixties; the
difficulty lies in translating "love and feeling" (psychology) into "power" (politics). Yet the need for doing so
remains.
The tendency of movements to become introverted
means that internal criticism is usually displaced on
external scapegoats, subsequently ostracized. Lack of
acute self-criticism becomes hypercritical political activity. On the platform, rhetoric overwhelms sensibility.
Thus I function less well with Women's Liberation in
its more virulent strains than with liberated women of
any faction: a liberated woman (or man) can say in private what dare not be said in public if the aggressive
image of the movement is to be maintained: "I'm sorry"
- for some unreasonable or oppressive demand. Public threats "for effect" or for "image-making" are exercises in exaggeration. "We have 53% of the population,"
Betty Friedan said in 1970; ''we have the power to make
changes. If we don't change institutions, the rage of
women is going to be destructive." Yet a New York
Times column (8/23/70) entitled "Women Surveyed on
Equality" carried the subhead, "Most Feel They're
Treated as Fairly as Men Are."
Friedan refers to "power" and "institutions." But that
"power" does not exist; the women's movement is in the
paradoxical position of trying to appear both as a majority (politically) and as a minority (psychologically).
"Power" also raises the subtle distinction between
enemy and ally that Densmore discusses. Much feminist
rhetoric, like Friedan's 53%, obscures the possibility of
men as allies, and overlooks the on-going process of
their own liberation as persons. Thus movements do
well to make the distinction Stokely Carmichael and
Charles Hamilton made in Black Power between personal and institutional racism (read: sexism). Men who
become allied to Women's Liberation (and straights who
!\bet Gay Liberation) will be liberated as persons long
before institutions, as Friedan puts it, are "changed."
In childhood, for every pink bedroom there has been
a blue one. In adolescence, for every female acnephobe
there has been a male pimple pincher; the cosmetics
industry has gouged us all. It is a matter of learned
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roles. And men who begin to perceive their own "imprinting," the "stamping" on them of sex-defined social
roles that oppress not only others but themselves as
well, will begin to perceive simultaneously the same roleplaying wherever it occurs - in men or in women.
Chauvinisme, ala Nicolas Chauvin's maniacal devotion
to Napoleonic service, will be resisted across the board.
Liberated men will reject the chauvinism of women;
liberated straights will reject the chauvinism of homosexuals. Symbols will yield to substance. Female protests against the utterance of "gal" will become dull and
dated - unless the protesters prefer to hang the word
like an albatross around the necks of men, who will
then cry "female-chauvinist-pig" at all women who
call them "guys."

~Getting Back Together
It is, as Robert Houriet titled his recent study of communes, a matter of Getting Back Together. Or, as in
Schiller/Beethoven: "Alle Menschen werden Bruder."
Or, in place of the "straight and narrow path," there
will be no longer any mountain path to social acceptability, any rite de passage, but instead "Every valley
shall be lifted up, and every mountain and hill be made
low;/ The uneven ground shall become level, and the
rough places a plain." (Is. 40:4) Liberation means "to
proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the
prison to those who are bound." (Is. 61 :1) Despite its
"let us reason together," Isaiah knows war; Dulles to
the contrary, liberation is always a war, always a struggle. As Isaiah knows, idolatry is bondage; and social
roles are the idols. From roles to libelous labels, stereotypes slander the humanity of persons. But "He who is
bowed down shall speedily be released." (Is. 51 :14).
Yet this war of liberation of captive peoples is not a
matter of wielding an impolitic sword. Rather, it requires
the heightened anarchy of mutual encounter, all the way
through to resolution. That includes confrontation between Millett and Mailer, Karlen and Hooker; distortion has no place in the making of free agreements. The
synthesis won't be all that the thesis wants it to be, nor
all that the antithesis hoped to preserve. But having
no shepherd to mediate between the wolf and the sheep,
we must rely on mutualist anarchy to keep us from each
other's throats as we bait and rebate, buff and rebuff.
Everyone needs to call the plays as he sees them, to be
willing to be called on his call, to respond to the call
to define, refine, and align, but not to submit.
As a member of the Brotherhood of the Spirit commune
in Warwick, Massachusetts said to an initiate in 1970
(Houriet, p. 353), "I'm not asking you to give up your
identity, just be more open and grow." In that remark,
somewhere, is the elusive meaning of liberation.
(See next page for Footnote and Related Readings)
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FOOTNOTE
Karlen 's passage reads:
" Hooker concluded that

homosexuals

may be 'very ordinary

Individuals ,

Indistinguishable, except In sexual pattern , from ordinary Individuals who are
heterosexual. Or . .. that some may be quite superior Individuals , not only de-

By etlmlnatlon , the only point Karlen can seem to be trying to make Is this :
that Hooker says that there ore o lot of well -adjusted homosexuals out there who
don 't come for treatment , but she 's wrong. And why? Because " some of the
sickest never go for treatment ." The logic of Karlen 's proposition Is appalling :
to show that none of those who don 't go for treatment are well , he asserts
some are sick.

void of pathology (unless one Insists that homosexuality Itself Is a sign of pathology) but also functioning at a superior level .' She suggested that homosexuality
as a clinical entity does not exist ; Its form s may be as varied as those of heter-
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Greek and Medieval Religious Drama: A Paradox
By CLAIRE A. HARDGROVE
Assistant Professor of Speech and Drama
Valparaiso University
Valparaiso, Indiana

One similarity between Greek and medieval drama
- both are closely bound up with religion - points to
a dissimilarity. The great religious drama in Greece
completely disintegrated and left little in its place. On
the other hand, when the medieval religious drama
ceased, it was followed by the rise of Elizabethan drama
which, ironically enough, rivalled the Greek religious
drama in grandeur and scope.
No doubt there are many reasons for this dissimilarity, but one of the most interesting can be found in the
material of the drama itself and its relation to the political structure of the day. Both the drama of the Greeks
and the drama of the Middle Ages had their foundations
not only in a popular religion but in a governmental
structure which gave it protection. However, when the
Athenian polis and its religion fell, the drama declined.
When the English feudal system and the Roman Church
lost its hold in England the drama flourished.
The Greek polis was built on political and religious
foundations forming a taut community of almost tribal
exclusiveness and bears little resemblance to Tudor or
even Plantagenet England. The Athenian polis was
more than a group of citizens united for protection. She
was governed and protected by a specific set of gods.
Patriotism found expression in religion - particularly in the religion of the great dramatic festival of Dionysus. It is not surprising that the average man in Athens
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was pious and would not allow criticism of the gods who
gave Athens its empire and on whose behalf such splendid festivals were celebrated. On the other hand, as
Martin Nilssen says, "... patriotism in that age could
find expression only in religion; but it robbed religion
of its power and indwelling value; it became a apanage
of patriotism and the individual's piety had but a narrowly restricted place in this collective and patriotic
worship." 1 Respect for the gods, pride of the conqueror,
and delight in the cultural achievements of the city ran
high in the Athenian heart. They mingled in the worship
at each of the yearly festivals and in some of the finest
drama the world has known.
The medieval Englishman lived in a tiny community,
often much smaller than the smallest Greek polis. But
the English community, as close as its internal ties might
be, was not an entity unto itself. The medieval man's
over-lord was an under-lord to some duke or king. He
owed his allegiance to his lord and, as the ties of the
monarchy became stronger under Henry II, to his king
as well. But this was not his only allegiance. He owed
his allegiance to that over-lord of his religion, the pope,
who held court far away from the tiny English village
or the towns of Chester or Wakefield or even London.
He was a member of St. Swithin's parish, for example,
but the intellectual and religious community to which
St. Swithin's belonged had its center a thousand miles
The Cresset

away. As England grew more nationalistic, the feudal
system weakened and collapsed. The scholastic theology
which had given the medieval religion its structure
came into disrepute with the humanists. It was no very
difficult thing when feudal ties had been broken to
break one more tie with the continent - the religious
tie.
In the Athenian polis each citizen lived close to the
Acropolis. This proximity kept each Athenian trained
in self-government and close to the cultural and religious center of his world. It gave him the opportunity
to participate directly in the religious and political life
of his own day. If he were wealthy he might be chosen
archon for a play; if he were not, at the very least he
might be in the theater for the awarding of the prize or
see Sophocles in his office of priest offer sacrifice.
On the other hand, the English country farmer or
town burgher was far away from the center of learning.
Even if he had lived on the doorstep of a monastery,
the undemocratic political structure of his society and
the convolutions of the philosophical theology of the
Schoolmen would have militated against his real participation in the system either politically or religiously.
The Greek drama, based on the worship of a Cretan
diety and still redolent of the Egyptian passion plays of
the god Osiris and his sister-wife Isis, grew up from the
necessity to offer sacrifice to the gods. This ritual moved
from formalized worship into mimesis and finally into
the structured drama of the Golden Age of Athens.
The Christian religious drama also participated-In
the sacrificial or prayer spirit but grew out of the highly
organized monastic system rather than folk worship.
The early Quem Quaeritis involved a barely discernible mimesis which was the simple acting out ·of the
miracle on the day of liturgical celebration.
The Greek priest who took upon himself the character
of Dionysus and the medieval cleric who took upon himself the character of Mary Magdalene or an angel followed similar paths in producing their religious drama.
As their drama developed, however, differences became
apparent. The Greek drama, even in its highest development in the Periclean Age, still held to the purpose of
its inception: the worship of the gods. The medieval
drama, as it expanded in content and form, flung off
its initial importance as a part of the liturgical celebration and became a palatable means by which the uneducated could be schooled in the Bible stories and
theological concepts.
The Greeks did not use their drama for theological
explication. The simple theology was based in the community, and "its component parts; state, clan and family". were developed, ·as Edith Hamilton says, not by
priests " .. . but by poets, artists and philosophers." 2
Homer was the Bible of the Greeks, and it had "the
same power over the Hellenes that the Bible had when
no one thought of doubting it."S Every school boy had
heard or read Homer. He needed no special explanation. The medieval Bible, the Latin Vulgate, had to be
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clarified for the English villager.
It is these facts which undoubtedly contributed to a
different handling of religious stories and myths in
Greece and England. The first was a democratic governmental form, the other was authoritarian. The Greeks
used their plays as worship as well as to teach. The
medieval plays tended to be solely didactic.
Now for some of the stories themselves. A good example is the transformation of the meaning of the
Agamemnon story from Aeschylus' Oresteia to SophoclEis' Electra. The myth is concerned with Iphigenia,
the daughter of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, who is
sacrificed to the goddess Artemis before the battle of
Troy. The winds fail when the Argives are on the island
of Aulis, and Artemis demands the sacrifice of the
young Argive princess before she will allow the merciful winds to carry the ships from the island.
In Aeschylus we find the goddess is a merciful deity
doing all in her power to avert the terrible war. In
Sophocles she is a despot who punishes grandly for
small offenses. In the Oresteia the Argives are stranded
on the island without wind to carry them to Troy.
Artemis gives Agamemnon two choices: he can return
to Argos and forget the war or he can sacrifice his young
daughter and move on Troy with Artemis' unwilling
assistance. When he chooses sacrifice it is his will over
the will of the goddess and he must pay the penalty for
it. When he returns he is murdered by his wife Clytemnestra, who can be seen as the instrument of the god
destined to bring divine vengeance on the murderer
of her child. Aeschylus' play is god-centered. He is
cOncerned with the will of the gods and the divine retribution for hubris.

The World of Man and God as a Stage
Sophocles' Electra written thirty years later changes
the story a great deal. In Electra Agamemnon has no
choice. He is stranded on the island. There will be no
wind to carry him to Troy or return him to Argos.
Unwittingly he has killed one of the deer dedicated to
the goddess, and the sacrifice of Iphigenia is an atonement for the deed. Like Oedipus, he is not morally
responsible for his action. But he will be punished none
the less. When Clytemnestra kills him, then, she is not
acting as a hand of the gods but an angry mother and,
more than that, a wanton in love with her paramour.
The point of emphasis in these two plays has shifted
from the divine to the human and it will shift even more
in Euripides when the stress is social criticism. The
myth, as we have seen, is the same but the dramatists'
interpretations are different.
In the medieval drama changes in the Biblical stories
were impossible, although the stories could be supplemented with other dramatic or comic materials. Let us
examine in a cursory way two plays dealing with the
Ark - one from Wakefield and one from Chester. In
both plays the characters are: God, Noah, Noah's wife
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and, very much in the background, Noah's sons and
their wives. The main events of the play are exactly
the same. Noah is ordered to build the Ark; he does so
with the help of his family; they board the Ark; the
deluge ensues. When he finally sends out the dove and
finds dry land Noah offers sacrifice (Chester) or thanks
God for his deliverance (Wakefield).
In Chester the play begins and ends with speeches by
God, the first concerning the reasons for the deluge, the
second concerning the promise never to destroy the
world by flood again. In the Wakefield play the first
and last speaker is Noah who makes for God many of
the complaints God had made in the former play. At
the end Noah speaks a prayer of thanksgiving for deliverance.4 It is obvious, of course, that Mrs. Noah's
lamentable wifeliness is not part of the Bible story but
was added simply to excite the interest of the unsophisticated audience. The rest of the play is very much the
story of Genesis.
The tendency to leave the Bible story intact was followed throughout the Middle Ages. Even the delightful
"Second Shepherd's Play" does not tamper with the
birth story of Christ. It merely sets the stage for its

serenity with the rolicking Mak plot. "The Sacrifice of
Isaac" in the Brome manuscript, though it has many
emotional moments, still carefully follows the Bible
story and is closely akin, as Joseph Adams says, to the
"Abraham and Isaac" of the Chester cycle.5
The verb commonly used to describe the later course
of religious drama in England and Greece is decline.
As a matter of fact the verb is correct only in the latter
instance. The religious drama of medieval England did
not decline; it merely, for all practical purposes, ceased
to exist.
The Protestant Reformation in England eventually
created a state church, strengthening English internal
political ties without a loss of religious belief. Though
Henry VIII tried to hold to most of the old traditions,
separating himself only from papal authority, two of
his children, Elizabeth and Edward, became militantly
Protestant. Orders went out during both of their reigns
forbidding performances of mystery plays on the grounds
that they taught popish dogma. The last mystery cycle
at Chester, a town which held out stoutly for continuation, was played in 1600. The York plays were suppressed long before in the year 1549, though they were pro-

See-ing
Letters from an Old
Next September, if this monthly column resumes for
a fourth year, there is going to be a change in the nonexistent dateline from Charlottesville to Boston. (And
maybe also - environment being a potent influence on
a person's thinking - a change in point of view from
easy-going small-town Southern conservative to the
flinty moral earnestness of a New England radic-lib.)
Whatever happens, two organizations are at the root
of it all, my own University of Virginia and the American Council of Learned Societies, which have come up
with enough money for me to put aside te!lching and
deaning for a year in order to work on an edition of
the letters of the historian Henry Adams.
Further accomplices are the Harvard University
Press and the Massachusetts Historical Society. They
have managed to get as editor-in-chief of the Adams
letters Professor Ernest Samuels of Northwestern University, who has already written a three-volume Pulitzer Prize biography of Adams. He in tum has decided
he needs an associate editor, and after some thoughtful
consideration extending over perhaps a half second I
decided to take him up on his offer for this post.
We have proceeded as far as some preliminary calculations - meaning impressively-phrased hunches and
intuitions - and have told the Harvard Press that something like six or seven large volumes will be needed to
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accommodate over 4000 letters. Now the Harvard Press
at last reports was using more red ink than black, and
in my mind's eye I see a good number of Cresset readers
nodding understandingly and wondering, "Who is this
Adams, and why would anybody want to buy and read
4000 of his letters?"
Consider. Henry Adams came to manhood as the
Civil War was ready to break out, and he died just a
few months before the World War I armistice. Much
was going on in the United States in this era, even besides those two numbing wars: a botched Reconstruction, the virtually hysterical business expansion of the
Gilded Age, the settling of the West and the end of the
frontier and the Indian, the McKinley-Roosevelt experiments with imperialism. Adams took time to watch
all this very closely from the sidelines; being a wealthy
man of leisure, he never had to hold a job of any kind
in business or professional life and was never offered
one in government.
He was essentially a philosophical historian, and he
gave us what is still the best account we have of the Jefferson-Madison era. Probably his most admired book
is a highly personal view of medieval French architecture and theology, Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres .
His most important book, The Education of Henry
Adams (1918), is called by its publisher "quite simply
The Cresset

duced in a sort of underground as late as 1569.
The religious war in England deeply affected English
drama. To understand the effects one must keep in mind
that the belief in God remained constant, the religious
war merely separated England from the rest of the continent, and the morality play was raised to ascendancy
because it could be used by both Protestants and Catholics to teach morality or as an instrument of propaganda. When the morality play came into its own the drama
was only a step away from the Elizabethan theater. In
the morality play God was not forgotten, but the emphasis was not so much on God's communication with man
but man's communication with God. This is the same
sort of emphasis one finds later in Elizabethan and
Jacobean drama.
The "decline" of religion in Athens was indeed a
decline. Edith Hamilton in her essay, "Athens' Failure,"·
comments on Plato's teaching that "the best laws were
mere forms unless the people obeyed the laws of God'
within them." 7 The Athenians neglected this deeper
obedience. Their fate came not from without but from
within - from a pride that was close to hubris. No
longer was Athens the darling of the gods, but a god

herself. When she attained that peak of pride she declined into self-seeking,8 and the Greek stage was not
fed like the burgeoning English stage with new ideas
and an abiding faith in God.
The paradox is unmistakable. The Greek mind, freer
and deeper than the medieval mind, found itself floundering once it had flung off the gentle strictures of
religious belief. The Elizabethan mind, though it had
rejected one of the most elaborate and comprehensive
bodies of theological thought the world has known,
gave imagination free play against a background of
belief. Though we have always thought of the Greeks as
the most serene of people, the Elizabethans, more than
the Greeks, seemed able to find a middle path. For the
Elizabethan the world of man and God was a stage.

1.
2.

3.
•·
5.
6.
7.
8.
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r:h Worth Knowing
the greatest autobiography in American letters," and I
think this is right.
That book is an account not only of his life but of an
obsolete dynasty and of the failure of the nation's ideals.
Henry Adams was the fourth generation of a political
dynasty that included Presidents John and John Quincy Adams, his great-grandfather and grandfather. The
ideals were those of a New World nation that hoped to
avoid Old World duplicity, chicanery, tyranny, and
superstition, and permanently establish a society of
honesty, democracy, statesmanship, and common sense.
Even Henry's dour great-grandfather, with all his skepticism based on the corruption of human nature, had
believed the American system would be something new
and quite wonderful.
In some ways it was, of course, and is. But to Henry
Adams the historian and observer, what transpired in
America between 1800 and 1900 was essentially a disillusioning story. And as for the future (our own times),
Adams, who had some rather accurate insights into the
problems of a technological society, thought things
looked rather gloomy as well.
His books and articles tell only part of what he was
thinking - the part he was willing to put before the
public. For the rest we have to go to his letters. Some
of these have already been published, in expurgated
May, 1972

and selective chunks, and in them we find how utterly
exasperating an individual Adams was. If burgeoning
America was bizarre, so was this cranky little man who
had the gall to throw up a brick mansion directly across
the park from the White House where he could keep
his eyes on all the Presidents who one by one failed to
reach his ancestors' stature - as he knew they would.
Scholar, social butterfly (he also kept a flat in Paris),
professional pessimist, and political cynic - this was
Henry Adams. He also traveled incessantly, commissioned the finest creation by America's greatest sculptor, wrote the memoirs of the Queen of Tahiti, and
courted platonically a much younger married woman
for thirty years.
He is, in short, a full education in himself. Anyone
trying to understand him needs to learn a great ·d eal
about history, politics, science, and human nature. Part
of the reward is a great deal of quiet entertainment,
because he had a way with words and a delightfully
perverse sense of humor.
All of which is to say that while working intensively
with him over the next year I will probably be unable
to resist a few reports along the way. And if you want
to enter a standing order for the final product you can
probably start setting aside $20 per volume and count
on delivery commencing about 1977.
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From the Chapel

Continuity with Christ
ByJAROSLAV PELIKAN

Sterlittg Profe••or of ReHgiou• Studie•
Yllle u,;,.,_.ity

New H.,.,, Cott-cticut

The entire Christian church, with all its institutions
and doctrines, is involved today in a deep crisis of continuity. Ideas and practices cherished for many centuries
are being challenged or discarded, but more far-reaching and more paralyzing than any such individual challenge is the numbing sense that the very continuance of
the Christian faith may itself be in jeopardy. As a historian of Christian doctrine, I am, of course, concerned
professionally as well as personally with the nature of
continuity in the church, and hence with the crisis of
continuity today.
The story of the confrontation between our Lord and
Peter at Caesarea Philippi in the sixteenth chapter of
the Gospel according to St. Matthew sets forth several
answers to the crisis of continuity, answers that have
also figured prominently in the search for continuity
throughout Christian history. There is, first of all, the
continuity of doctrine in the confessional tradition:
"Now when Jesus came in the district of Caesarea Philippi, he asked his disciples, 'Who do men say that the
Son of man is?' And they said, 'Some say John the Baptist, others say Elijah, and others Jeremiah or one of
the prophets.' He said to them, 'But who do you say that
I am?' Simon Peter replied, 'You are the Christ, the Son
of the living God.'"
In one form or another this confession .has been declared to the church and to the world by Christian believers in every generation. Each of the terms in it has
been the subject of careful philological analysis and
philosophical explanation, each of them has found its
way into some part ofthe creedal formulas of the church.
Whatever else it may mean to be a Christian, it ought to
mean some reaffirmation of this confession. For Luther,
therefore, this was the central point of this story. Peter
speaks here for the entire orthodox Christian community, identifying the Jesus of life, death, and resurrection as the Chosen One of God and as the Son of God. It
is some distance, but not an unbridgeable distance, from
Caesarea Philippi to the Councils of Nicaea and of
Chalcedon ; and in the repeated affirmation of the confession of Peter, together with that of the 318 fathers of
Nicaea, much of orthodox Christianity has found the
guarantee of what Eusebius, the first church historian,
called "the successions of the holy apostles."
Yet Eusebius's very use of that phrase calls to mind
another guarantee of continuity set forth in this text,
and the one that is the most celebrated: "And Jesus
answered him, 'Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona! For
flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my
Father who is in heaven. And I tell you, you are Peter,

16

and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates
of hell [ powers of death 1shall not prevail against it. I
will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and
whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven,
and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in
heaven.' Then he strictly charged the disciples to tell
no one that he was the Christ.''
Inscribed in unforgettably glorious letters around the
dome of St. Peter's, chanted by obsequious bishops, and
expounded in endless detail by papal theologians, the
words of Christ to Peter form the charter for a theology
of continuity that finds it in the succession of the church's
institutional structures from the apostles to the present.
Whether this succession be thought of episcopally or
papally or even congregationally, it does mean that we
are to look to the institutions of the church for the
assurance that there will always be a Christianity and
that the Christianity we now have is indeed one, holy,
catholic, and apostolic. The Papacy is, after all, the
oldest monarchy whose persistence can be documented
historically; the church is the oldest continuing cultural
force in the Western world; and the gates of hell, from
Nero to Stalin, have failed to destroy its continuity. It
is a source of reassurance just to know that it is still there.
Or is it? The dome of St. Peter's, big as it is, does not
seem to have had room for the whole story of Caesarea
Philippi. After the confession of Peter and the promise
of Christ comes the portentous paragraph: "From that
time Jesus began to ' show his disciples that he must go
to Jerusalem and suffer many things from the elders
and chief priests and scribes, and be killed, and on the
third day be raised. And Peter took him and began to
rebuke him, saying, 'God forbid, Lord!' This shall never
happen to you. But he turned and said to Peter, 'Get
behind me, Satan! You are a hindrance to me; for you
are not on the side of God, but of men.'"
"On this rock I will build my church"? Some church!
Some rock! The orthodox creed just affirmed has suddenly become a sign of apostasy and of discontinuity.
For Peter says that Christ is K yrios and says "God forbid" to the message of the cross. Not everyone who
calls him "Lord, Lord" will enter into the kingdom. The
affirmation of who he is, which is the central content of
the creed, becomes a hindrance unless it includes the
affirmation of what he came to do: "go to Jerusalem and
suffer many things from the elders and chief priests and
scribes, and be killed, and on the third day be raised."
Thus it ha.s been that for entire ages of the history of
the church her confession, orthodox enough in its formulas, has been a "hindrance" to Christ and to continThe Cresset

uity with him, being not on the side of God but of men,
so that the bold confessor of Christ becomes Antichrist.
But the continuity that is rooted in the structures of
the·church is no greater a source of reassurance. Leaving
out all the historical debates since the promulgation of papal infallibility in 1870, the history of the
institutional church of every denomination is anything
but an unbroken succession of faithfulness to Christ
and to his gospel. It is a tragic series of moral and religious defeats, of capitulation to the world without and
to the tempter within. More often than any of us would
like to acknowledge, the rock on which Christ has been
obliged to build his church has been the Peter of "God
forbid, Lord!" rather that the Peter of "You are the
Christ, the Son of the living God." If this is to be the
church's continuity with Christ, we had better fasten our
safety belts.
But the story does not end there. Peter's confession of
the doctrine of the person of Christ is followed by Peter's
heresy on the doctrine of the work of Christ, but both of
these are followed in turn by the charter of continuity
with Christ: "Then Jesus told his disciples, 'If any man
would come after me, let him deny himself and take up
his cross and follow me. For whoever would save his
life will lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake
will find it. For what will it profit a man, if he gains the
whole world and forfeits his life? Or what shall a man
give in return for his life?"'
This summons to self-denial and invitation to discipleship are the abiding element amid what the Book
of Common Prayer calls "the changes and chances of
this present life." Even those church fathers and modern
theologians whose speculations constituted a threat to
the confession of the orthodox faith managed somehow
to hear the summons and to heed the invitation. Origen,
the greatest genius of the ancient church, might have
had difficulty being recognized as orthodox even by the
standards of American Protestantism, but his life and
spirituality were consecrated to taking up the cross and
following his Lord. Adolf von Harnack, the greatest
theological scholar of his time, could not even be ordained; but his persistent question was, "How do I
manage to become his disciple?" And that same Harnacksaw, in his famous lectures on What Is Christianity?,
that the constant force in Christian history, across theo-

logical conflicts and denominational rivalries, has been
the call of Christ to discipleship. It still is.
Yet the greatest danger is to sentimentalize the call
to discipleship or to equate its content either with the
Boy Scout law or with some particular scheme for social reform. At this moment, here and now, it is not only
proper but necessary for Christians, in their discipleship, to develop patterns of personal morality and
strategies for social justice; even American Lutheranism
has finally discovered this. But the continuity of the
faith does not lie there. Finally, when discipleship has
been probed to its depths, we must ask not only Harnack's question, "How do I manage to become his disciple?" but his other question as well: "Is the Divine
that has appeared on earth and reunited men with God
identical with that Divine which rules heaven and earth,
or is it a demigod?" And when we have answered that
question in faithfulness to our vocation as disciples, the
answer will surely come close to Peter's confession at
Caesarea Philippi - and, I would, add to the confession
of the 318 fathers at Nicaea.
Nor is it enough to let such a confession fly off into
the air and then to wait a generation or two so that
faith may "happen" again. Faith may indeed be a "happening," although I have difficulty imagining the
German theologians, who say it is, participating in
present-day "happenings." But it can happen only because between the happenings and between the times
there is a community that remembers and celebrates
and expects, an ecclesiastical structure, if you please,
that cannot live up to its foundation but cannot forget
its Founder - and cannot let anyone else forget him
either. The point of discipleship is not the disciple but
the Master; the content of confession is not theology
but Christ; the life of the church is not her institutions
but her dying and risen Lord. In him is her life - and
ours. In him is the continuity of discipleship, of doctrine, and of structure. And so, as T.S. Eliot reminds us,
There shall always be the church and the world,
And the heart of man
Shivering and fluttering between them, choosing and
chosen,
Valiant, ignoble, dark and full of light,
Swinging between hell gate and heaven gate.
And the gates of hell shall not prevail.

NetsofLaughter--------------------------------------~
The wry wind scudded us
into the carnival field
and we were bounced to and fro
in nets of laughter.
Victory whistles pointed us
toward the slickered guy
whose catcher's-mask-face
received the burst of balloon
splashing three-cent water
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hurled by my small imp's
glee of revenge.
Racing back again
to the squared-off board,
hands filled with pennies
to pin down a prize,
she pranced away
with balls and puzzles.
Popcorn frothed her

into a sky-kicking swing,
while I leaned on wind,
accepting invitations to return.
A much tireder wind
shoved us across the pebbled time
into our home schedule
of goodnight.
BONNIE McCONNEL
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The MISI Media

The Unchurched Jesus

---------------------------------------------------------------------------By RICHARD LEE
Odd, isn't it? While the churches are now producing
less for the mass media, the world is singing more songs
and telling more stories about Jesus in them.
Maybe it's not so odd. The churches' present retreat
from the m:edia can be grasped under a few headings.
Mountainous production costs which faith alone wilf
not move. Some distrust of the media themselves by
the man-in-the-street and the man-in-the-pew. Some
suspicion of the distant administrative centers of the
churches which control the massest media productions. Dwindling assured audiences - always excepting the endurable sects - for conventional productions. Less social pressure upon the media to provide
"public service" time and space for "religion." The
nettlesome theological difficulties of putting Jesus
as the Christ before a secular society amusing itself
with this and that transcendence-of-the-month. And,
not least, the squabbles within the churches which
render them unfit hospitals for sinners - much less
fit for any mission through the mass media to the world.
I do not discount the wholesome possibility that some
churches are taking a sharper look at some over-investments in the mass media and disceming more of the
limitations of the media for the gospel. The gospel,
after all, is not an "image" but a person, and those whom
the churches would reach are not "markets" but persons
too. We must always pray that God will not let his
churches be the last to distinguish between the work of
persons to persons and the work of machines.
Also, maybe it's not so odd for the world to mount
the Jesus story in the media. All the liveliest elements
of entertainment are in it, and it certainly isn't novel
to sell it as well as tell it. Probably one of the first film
rip-offs was a life of Jesus, shot by Americans in Bohemia, and falsely promoted at home as the Passion Play
of Oberammergau. The year? 1897. The present crest
of Jesus plays, songs, and films has at least 75 years of
momentum behind it.
Perhaps the most pivotal and piously intended Jesus
film is nearly as old, From the Manger t~ the Cross, shot
in 1911. It's worth digging out of a film museum if only
to see the epicene Jesus film as it was fixed almost as a
formula over sixty years ago. Eerily, Jesus is played by
R . H.Bland.
Since then Jesus films have come and gone, a few adequate, many awful, some exploiting the subject and some
well-meaning. I haven't, of course, seen them all, but
it strikes me that the older the film the more likely it is
to be an exploitation. Filmgoers who were taken ill in
the last decade by King of Kings (1962), The Greatest
Story Ever Told (1965), and The Gospel According to
Saint Matthew (1965) really owe themselves a museum
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viewing of Cecil B. DeMille's silent King of Kings
(1927). Jesus films have, in fact, been gaining on honesty.
Older readers will forgive me if I tell younger readers
that much of the first King of Kings is given to Mary
Magdalene played as a gorgeous courtesan and to her
lover, Judas lscariot! The obligatory bath scene, as I
recall , takes more footage than the last supper.
Jesus films are not, of course, only about Jesus. Oblique
references to him appear in films like The Robe, The
Silver Chalice, and Ben Hur. If Jesus seemed squeezed
into the sword-and-sandal spectaculars of the 50's, he
was more likely to disappear altogether in the 60's and reappear as a "Christ-figure." Now, Christ-figures
tend to be where one finds them (The category often
invites absurd claims, like currently christening John
Wayne in The Cowboys), and I tread lightly here. But
probably the most painfully obvious Christ-figure film
of the 60's was Cool Hand Luke (1967). Certainly the
most ironic one was Whistle Down the Wind (1962) in
which an escaped convict, sheltered by a neighborhood
of little children, is finally moved to "give himself up
for them" because they believe him to be Jesus.
What lies ahead? As the fascination for Jesus peters
out in popular (not country) music, something should
be panning out in film. (Popular music leads the fashion in popular culture as a whole - unless it's a packaged deal like Love Story of film, song, and paperback
at once.) Norman Jewison aspires to direct Jesus Christ
Superstar "on location" in the "holy land" this summer,
and the less said about that the better. Franco Zeffirelli
is now scripting The Assassination of Christ, focusing
on the trial, and that sounds more promising. And we
shall surely get at least one out-of-the-way film on the
"Jesus Freaks." A fanzine forewams me of the scenario
of one now in the works, The Lovin' Man, Jesus, but it
is not discussable in this joumal.
At this writing (Holy Saturday, 1972) an intriguing
new Jesus film has just played TV. Mixed in the usual
holiday fare (In my market area: re-runs of Barrabbas,
The Silver Chalice, and a PBS re-broadcast of last year's
praiseworthy, if boring, Passion Play for Americans)
was a new work, The Crucifixion ofJesus.
The CrucJfixion will likely run again next Eastertide
and I commend it to all of faith and unfaith alike. One
of a series of films Wolper Pictures is shooting for CBS's
"Appointment with Destiny" series, The Crucifixion is
filmed in the style of a documentary. It is as if news of
the events of holy week were reported like a presidential
trip to China or, better, the trial of Daniel Ellsberg. The
hour production (The sponsor, Timex, mercifully does
not interrupt The Crucifixion with commercials for
wristwatches) is tautly paced, arousing suspense for a
The Cresset

story everyone already knows.
The basic elements of the documentary are (1) scenes
from the public life of Jesus, as if videotaped by mobile
camera crews; (2) narration by John Huston as "anchorman"; (3) man-in-the-street interviews (an Essene, a
Zealot, a soldier, faceless others); and (4) still shots, as
if mounted in a newspaper morgue. A final (5) element
is most effectively used - longer, relaxed interviews
with "insiders" on the event to achieve some "in depth"
analysis long after it has passed. Particularly insightful
here are interviews with Caiaphas, Pilate, a Greek
physician and several disciples to present the views of
a kept church and imperial state, reason and faith.
Strange to say, none of the retrospective interviews
mention resurrection, and the book is preferrable to
the film on that point. (There is some slight mention of
resurrection in Huston's narration, but he makes it
sound like a liberal cliche.) The film, however, doesn't
wallow in that sentimentality which believes nothing
good ever happens; it simply treats the story of Jesus
more as thanatography than biography.
The director, Robert Guenette, of no religious abode,
says he took "the historical view rather than the traditional one." Such a view of history is, of course, naive.
The Crucifixion - while assuredly not the traditional
From the Manger to the Cross view of Jesus- is probably
no nearer to history than other Jesus films. It is more
properly called a view of Jesus in the "modem tradition," with all the historicism the term implies. It is
that view of Jesus reflecting the bias of the questions
the world in our time is capable of asking the past.
The newsreel format to focus on "the facts," interviews
to add "the in-terpretation," the use of the old city of

Jerusalem for the ancient setting (avoiding, of course,
those ghastly 19th century shrines), the consultations
with theologians to get the Essenes and Zealots "right,"
and other historicist devices merely add contemporary
preoccupations to the story.
All of which is not to say that The Crucifixion isn't a
good story. It is not only a very good story, but enough
of a Christian story that it is possible it could call forth
faith, or enough curiosity to send out seekers.
Jesus is played by a sensitive amateur, a young Jewish
theological student, Ronald Greenblatt. His voice is
unheard in the film and he performs totally with his
considerable spiritual presence. His is a quiet, deeply
moving performance of Jesus as an eastem holy mana man, say, who would embrace the leprous without
loathing, see the poor as persons rather than the proletariat, and spend himself listening to the ignorant
without condescension. His Jesus is more holy man
than ethical man, more guru than rebel, more Bodhisattva 'than prophet. It is a . distinctly 1972 Jesus.
It is also a worthy complement to orthodox views
which tend to deny Jesus an individual personality and
see him as a sacrifice going somewhere to happen or as
the Logos on its way to a manifestation. This Jesus, in
short, will seem slightly strange to viewers in our country where holy men on the streets are rare and where
Jesus of Nazareth is too quickly dissolved into some
doctrine in the churches. In that strangeness lies an
attraction to Jesus which could make Satan uneasy in
his present power. _
Since one cannot always say that for the churched
Jesus, this unchurched Jesus is possibly uncovenanted
grace.

Music

The People - Sit
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B y WILLIAM F. EIFRIG, JR.

I intend to write about Elgar's Dream of Gerontius.
The time between hearing Gerontius and this time of
writing about it has been enough to find me in the first
instance in Royal Albert Hall, London, and in the second
instance on the Spanish Mediterranean coast. The delights of Spain have not erased the memories of the
English music. They have only made it seem so very
foreign.
In Spain my ears relax as my whole being relaxes
under clear skies and a benign sun. All is so silent here.
The narrow passages between the ancient buildings
permit only pedestrians and are very quiet. Voices are
filtered through the louvers of shuttered windows.
Somewhere a canary is caged and bursting his heart
with a song one can barely hear.
On the street the nearest music is the Spanish voice.
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It is low-pitched, uttered in fortissimo tempo, and depends upon total inflection for communication. A small
circus moves through the streets, and the acrobats and
clowns take up trumpets with ease as if every boy in
Spain must leam that instrument from infancy.
The Spanish are musical, no doubt of it. But they
care little for music as a separate, self-conscious activity.
Trumpet playing is part of a circus act. A procession in
Holy Week requires a band. Radios and record players
are used when suitable to the atmosphere and mood
but are not used continuously to set the atmosphere and
mood. A guitar belongs to a serenade.
Gerontius is fora people devoted in numbers to making
music as though nothing else is more important at the
moment. The work - Elgar did not like to call it an
oratorio - requires a large orchestra, double choir
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with semi-chorus, and soloists. The audience is expected
to sustain attention for two hours (with one interval)
while the long poem is presented.
Elgar's music for Newman's poem is as contradictory
as the English character itself. A Roman Catholic creates a national monument for an Anglican country.
Wagnerian musical techniques are put to work for religious ideas the German master abhorred. But Gerontius is a towering achievement for all that.
Part I is as flawless an expression of thought, feeling,
and narrative as any Englishman or Spaniard could
want. The dying Gerontius prays that his friends will
pray for him when he has no more strength in himself,
and that prayer will move the hearts even of Christians
for whom prayers for the dead are suspect.
If Elgar falters, it is in Part II when he calls upon his
art to bring heaven to earth. But it is noble in its aspiration if not always in achievement. Newman's God is not
a kindly old grandfather who says "Let bygones be bygones," nor a gentlemanly gamesman who decides "All

the outs in free." The pain of purgation and the agonies
of divine justice are felt in Elgar's music. It is not the
sound of an easy hope.
Elgar, a self-taught musician, suspected academic
musicians his whole life. Perhaps his fear was that music
accredited by a guild may not speak the heart of a whole
people. "Land of Hope and Glory" was intended to
"knock 'em on their ears." He intended the same effect
with Gerontious, although the audience for the former
may be larger than the audience for the latter. The
musical beliefs of both are identical, however, and all
music, for Elgar, is popular art.
A band accompanying the procession of holy images
in Seville played the Chopin funeral march. I should
not be surprised to hear it, on another occasion, play
Elgar's "Land of Hope and Glory." Popular masterpieces cross cultures as common coin.
Gerontius, though, is a religious experience too selfconscious for Spanish hearts. And the Spanish sun does
not shine in Royal Albert Hall.

Political Affairs

A Guide to Labels
----------------------------------------------------------------------------ayALBERTR.TROST

American political rhetoric in recent years has been
riddled with the terms "left" and "right," conservative,
liberal, radical , and moderate. These terms frequently
bear the modifiers, "extreme" and "far. " Even the Democratic Party's candidates in recent presidential primaries
have been strung along a spectrum from Shirley Chisholm on the "far left" to George Wallace on the "extreme right."
These terms are somewhat out of place in American
politics. They overstate the importance of ideology in
the electorate, and they suggest greater differences
among parties and candidates than actually exist. The
terms are seldom used for self-identification. They are
most frequently used to brand one's opponents as standing outside of the mainstream of American politics.
Left, right, conservative, liberal, radical, and moderate have their origins in European parliamentary politics. The terms left and right, for instance, have their
origins in the ·seating arrangements of the continental
European houses of parliament. The chambers of the
legislature are commonly in the shape of a semi-circle,
and legislators sit in the chamber according to their
position on the ideological spectrum.
A typical seating of parties is that of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Scanning the chamber from left to
right one sees the Communists, the Socialists (left-wing
then right wing), Republicans, Christian Democrats,
(approximately in the center), Liberals, Monarchists,
and Neo-Fascists. The full range of American electoral
politics could be placed within the three parties of the

Italian center, the Republicans, the Christian Democrats, and the Liberals. Even in these three Italian parties there is more ideological diversity than exists in
the United States.
The terms "conservative" and "liberal" also originated in Europe and were used to refer to different views
of central authority. Conservatives favored strong central authority, usually personified in a hereditary monarch, although Napoleon Bonaparte would also be accepted in the tradition. Conservatives also tended to
take the organic view that the state's legitimacy was
independent of individual consent to the rule. It is
this latter view which conservatives in Europe shared
with their neighbors on the right, the Bonapartists and
Fascists.
Liberals were those who opposed the centralizing
tendency in European government and championed
the rights and dignity of the individual against the
central authority. The Whigs in England are an example of this liberalism which had much more acceptance
in the British Isles than on the continent of Europe.
The name of John Locke is usually associated with this
tradition.
A third political tradition originating in Europe is
most accurately called communitarianism, but it would
scarcely be known by that name in the United States.
Where liberalism emphasized the individual, communitarianism stressed the importance of community and
moved toward the organic view of the conservatives.
However, communitarianism is like liberalism in its
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basis of the legitimacy of the state on popular consent
and citizen participation in govemment. For some of
the founders of this tradition, like Rousseau, the community is located in the expression of majority will,
and legitimate govemment is based on such expression.
Others in this tradition associated community with
class, and legitimate authority was that exercised on
behalf of the class of destiny. In the case of the Marxists, for example, legitimate govemment was that exercised in the name of the working-class.
With the exception of Britain and possibly Norway,
modem European political parties represent the conservative and communitarian tendencies, with the liberal tradition all but squeezed-out. This last tradition is
upheld by the tiny Free Democratic Party in Germany,
the Radicals in France and the Republicans and Liberals in Italy.
In the United States, there are some who argue that
there is only one political tradition: liberal. It is certainly true that the earliest immigrants to this country
believed only that govemment legitimate which protected the rights of individuals to life, liberty and property. This early immigration was largely from a politically-motivated dissenting middle-class from Northem Europe, and it was in this tradition that the American Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights
were written.
It is possible to see this liberal tradition as the thread
running from Madison and Jefferson through Thoreau
and Emerson to Sumner and the "social Darwinists."
It runs today through the thought of men as varied as
William Buckley, Justice William Douglas, Justice
Hugo Black, the early S.D.S. and Eugene McCarthy.
This contemporary range of claimants to the liberal
tradition indicates how encompassing it is in American politics. It takes in a figure of the "right" like Buckley and a figure of the "left" like McCarthy.
The communitarian tradition has also found its way

into American politics, especially in times of mass discontent. In times of crisis, strong presidents like Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt have stressed community,
and their administrations have been less notable for
protection of civil liberties. Populist movements in
America also favor the communitarian tradition in
their appeals to remedy the plight of "the little man,"
or "the silent majority," or "the people." The principles of equality and majority rule are comfortable in the
communitarian tradition, but they collide with the
principles of minority or individual rights in the liberal
tradition.
The communitarian tradition entered the United
States with the founding fathers, especially in Jefferson's fascination with the French Revolution. It did not,
however, vie with the liberal tradition in political rhetoric and practice until Jackson's presidental campaign
and administration. Immigrations from central and
southem Europe where the communitarian tradition
was strong furthered this tradition in America throughout the nineteenth century. In modem times the communitarian tradition has dominated movements as far
apart as the New Deal and the "right-wing" Christian
fundamentalists like Carl Mcintire and Billy James
Hargis. There is also a large dose of communitarian
appeal in the Nixon-Agnew campaigns as well as those
of Hubert Humphrey and George Wallace.
Most American politicians embody both the liberal
and communitarian traditions. Few are conscious of the
inconsistencies. The low level of support for the more
consistent spokesmen of the two traditions like William
Buckley and Americans for Democratic Action suggests
that the American people are unclear about (or do not
care about) their own positions on the political spectrum. The labels "left," "right," liberal and conservative, as they are currently used in American political
rhetoric, only serve to confuse. It would be better if the
labels were removed.

Books of the Month

To Make Some Sense Out of the Old Testament
LITERARY CRITICISM OF THE OLD
TESTAMENT. By Norman Habel. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971. $2 .50 .
FORM CRITICISM OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By Gene M. Tucker. Philadelphia :
Fortress Press, 1971. $2.50.
TRADITION HISTORY AND THE OLD
TESTAMENT. By Walter E. Rast. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972. $2 .50 .
In the Fortress Press series, Guides to
Biblical Scholarship, these three volumes
:epresent the Old Testament series, edited
by J. Coert Rylaarsdam. Fortress Press also

May, 1972

has three companion volumes on the literary
criticism , form criticism and redaction criticism of the New Testament. Although these
volumes tend to be expensive ($2.50 for an
80 page paperback), this series will fill a gap
in communication between biblical scholars
and general readers of the Bible - a gap that
in some circles has become a real credibility
problem with serious consequences for the
church.
The authors of these three volumes are all
competent biblical scholars: Norman Habel
of Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, Missouri, Gene Tucker of Emory University, and
my colleague Walter Rast of Valparaiso

University. They are well-qualified to present
the methods of biblical scholarship in an
understandable way for non-specialists and,
in addition, to point the way toward the
pressing future tasks of biblical research.
There are a great many books on biblical
studies written for the non-specialist - general surveys, introductions, etc., informing
the reader of the more important and interesting results of current biblical scholarship.
But few of these popular treatments introduce
the reader concretely into the methodological
procedures and problems of such scholarship .
As a result, often the non-specialist has little conception at all of the critical approach

21

to the Bible, or he has misconceptions of the
nature of such scholarship. Debates are still
carried on, for example, about the historical
critical method as if Wellhausen were still
the main representative of biblical scholarship. These Guides to Biblical Scholarship
will help to solve this situation by making
available to all students of the Bible concise,
clear discussions of the critical methods being used by scholars.

The Oral Setting of Authorship
These three volumes represent the three
main disciplines of current critical study of
the Old Testament (tradition criticism and
redaction criticism , sometimes treated as
separate disciplines, are here discussed together in the volume on Tradition History and
the Old Testament) . Literary criticism is of
course basic for any analysis of a given portion of the Old Testament, distinguishing as
it does the literary structure, style, and perspective of the author or authors. Form criticism is important for analyzing the literary
genres, their structures, intentions, settings
and functions . And tradition history criticism
attempts to synthesize the literary and form
critical studies in order to trace the formation
and development of the various traditions in
all their stages from the first forms to the
final redaction. In a sense these three methods
stand as separate disciplines, but the interrelationship between them is important, as
Rylaarsdam points out in his Foreword. A
good discussion of the relationship and interdependence between the disciplines is given
by Tucker in his description of the role of
form criticism .
One wonders , however, why it was necessary for these three introauctions to be issued
as separate books, when they might have constituted one nice-sized volume. Besides adding to the cost of purchase, the fact that there
are three volumes will no doubt lead some
readers to be content to study only one or
two. Yet one of the important values of the
series is that three different scholars have
presented the three different but complementary methods of studying the Old Testament,
in contrast to presentations that tend to be
more one-sided (cf. , e.g., Klaus Koch's The
Growth of the Biblical Tradition: the FormCritical Method) . It is the interaction and
the mutuaJ stimulus of the three methods of
study which has helped to produce much of
'the freshness and creativity of current biblical scholarship, and the reader will miss that
value if he does not work through three presentations.
Norman Habel's presentation of literary
criticism is especially important because the
literary analysis of the Old Testament is generally felt to have been discredited with the
rise of the methods of form analysis and tradition history analysis, stressing as they do the
pre-literary development of the forms and
traditions. Habel demonstrates that, on the
contrary , literary criticism remains primary in
the analysis of any book or literary segment of
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the Old Testament. This method of study
now has a whole set of new challenges and
questions to work on; in contrast to literary
criticism in the past, this analysis must now
take account of oral literature, cultic contexts, communal authorship, and the history
of the development of the text.
It is well that, for the purposes of this
series, Habel chose to omit a discussion of
the history of the method of literary criticism
in favor of a direct textual approach. There
are many other books which discuss literary
criticism as practiced in the past; Habel
wisely devotes the major portion of the book
to actual literary investigations of selected
Old Testament writings. As the reader follows Habel's masterful uncovering of the
literary styles, terminologies and perspectives
of the two main literary traditions in Genesis
1-9 , important insights into the various motifs
and theological messages are discovered as
well. His analysis of the basic programme of
both the Priestly and Yahwistic sources in the
Pentateuch will greatly aid the reader's attempt to make some sense out of the Old
Testament literature.
An important dimension of literary , criticism in many disciplines has to do with
hermeneutical issues, with questions as to the
nature and role of language, etc. Habel, reporting on current Old Testament scholarship, omits any discussion of this dimension.
Partly because the literary analysis of the
Old Testament has been eclipsed by other
methods, this discipline has apparently lost
touch with literary criticism as it is being
developed in other fields. However, Habel
does note the importance of hermeneutics
and the philosophy of language for the future
task of Old Testament scholarship.
Gene Tucker spells out very clearly the
basic principles, goals and procedures of form
criticism, showing both its basic importance
in the study of the Old Testament, but also
warning of its limitations. There has been
some tendency to assume that analysis of the
forms in the Old Testament literature will
solve all the problems of interpretation. But
Tucker rightly insists that categorization of
the literary . forms is useful only insofar as
it serves the purpose of recovering the living
literature of Israel in its setting in their life
and culture. In fulfilling this purpose, form
criticism must work closely with the other
methods of study.
Tucker helps the reader understand the
methodology used by form critics by referring
to examples from contemporary life. Then he
illustrates the. method by analyzing the literary forms used in two biblical sections :
Jacob wrestling at the Jabbok , and the prophetic literature (examples from Amos). In this
way the reader can comprehend clearly the
basic steps of form analysis: determining the
structure, the genre, the setting in life, and
the intention.
Tucker's discussion of form criticism shows
the heavy debt which Old Testament scholars
owe to Herman Gunkel, the pioneer in form
critical studies. But here is also perhaps a

weakness of current Old Testament scholarship: it has been difficult moving beyond
Gunkel and his presuppositions. His categories
are still used, even though some of them are
clearly inadequate and lead to difficulties
and misunderstandings. The category of
"myth," for example, is very misleading when
used as a category of literary form , especially
when scholars (like Tucker) use this category
as a way of distinguishing Israel's faith from
other cultures of the ancient Near East. One
hopes that Old Testament form critical
scholarship, which has become highly sophisticated and successful in many ways , will
begin to move beyond Gunkel and find alternate models in research that is being carried
on in other disciplines also.
An unfortunate omission in Tucker's lucid
presentation of Old Testament form criticism
has to do with the cultic setting of many of
the basic forms . Neither in his pres~ntation of
the methodology nor in his examples of its
use does Tucker pay much attention to the
basic cultic orientation which is an important
aspect in the development and transmission
of the forms . Another weak point in his
presentation is his failure to demonstrate the
importance of oral tradition in the development of the forms; although he rightly
lists the oral setting as a basic principle of
form criticism, he does not carry through on
this point in his discussion to any great extent. Nor does he attempt to show the theological implications that result from the application of the form critical method - which ,
of course, is not demanded in the purpose of
the book but which would be helpful to the
general reader.

The Transmission of Traditions
Fortunately, Walter Rast's presentation. of
tradition history research fills in some of these
weaker areas of Tucker's book, just as Tucker's description of form criticism provides an
important supplement to the discussion of
tradition history. Rast shows by theory and
example the importance of investigating the
transmission and the formative development
of the Old Testament traditions , up to their
redaction in their present form . He points to
the necessity, first of all, of understanding
the dynamics of the transmission of traditions
in 'general - using such examples as the
Homeric epics and the Gilgamesh Epic. In
this connection, the great significance of oral
transmission of traditions is stressed. Rast ·
wisely presents both sides of the oral versus
:ovritten transmission debate, suggesting . that
it is in the interplay of both oral and written
transmission that the formation of the traditions actually took place. Some of the Scandinavian scholars of the so-called "Uppsala
School" are given recognition by Rast for
their important contributions in traditiohistorical researches.
Rast sketches out a useful methodology of
tradition history analysis which involves
determining the group which transmits- the
tradition , the locale, the socio-cultic setting,
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and the basic themes. Then he illustrates
this method by investigating the Jacob-Esau
and Jacob-Laban cycles. At this point it is
especially clear how closely form criticism and
tradition history analysis are interrelated;
it is interesting to compare Tucker and Rast
in their respective analyses of the saga of
Jacob's wrestling at the Jabbok , noting the
different foci of the two methods.
Rast also has a useful discussion of the
history of the traditions represented in Second
Isaiah, showing how rooted this prophet was
in the cultic traditions of creation and the
exodus. In general, Rast shows a deep sensitivity to the rootedness of the Israelite traditions in the cultic life of the people.
A special value of Rast's book is his insight
into the theological significance of the traditiohistorical method of research. He follows von
Rad in finding a central characteristic of

Israel's faith to be its openness to the creative
reinterpretation of the traditions of the past
in the context of present realities - and the
expectation of future activity of God that
exceeds past and present understandings. Of
interest in connection with Old Testament
theology is Rast's insistence that von Rad 's
important Old Testament Theology, which is
strongly based on tradition history research ,
should not be passed off as merely a history
of Israelite religion; Rast prefers to call it
"a historical theology of the Old Testament."
Finally , Rast shows how research in the
transmission of Old Testament traditions
helps to clarify the relationship between the
testaments, the whole concept of revelation,
and the task of the theologian in the contemporary world.
These three volumes should prove to be
useful contributions to the understanding of

current Old Testament scholarship. There
are weak spots, especially if the separate
volumes are taken in isolation. There is a
remarkable continuity, however, if the three
volumes are studied in the sequence of the
historical development of the three disciplines :
first literary criticism , then form criticism ,
and finally the more wholistic tradition history analysis. Fortunately, when read in this
manner, the three books give a good perspective on the methodological theory of the thr~e
disciplines and, in addition, a sustained
immersion into the actual investigation of
the Old Testament text itself.
I would recommend these volumes for careful study by students, pastors, profe•• vrs ,
and any serious reader of the Old Testament.

leluia: A Word and its Effect"; and "Beowulf
and the Liturgy." Because this last essay
contains an easy illustration of the direct .
manner of appeal which is the trademark
of Dr. Cabaniss, I quote it as an example
of both the style and substance of his thought:
We have therefore, in the account of Beowulf's encounter with Grendel's mother,
a strong central reminiscence of Christ's
harrowing of hell that widens to include
recollections, next of the deluge, and then
of creation. We may now inquire where
else we have the same complex of ideas .
The answer is to be found in rites associated with Christian baptism . (p. 103)

This is a remarkable poetic affirmation of
II Corinthians 12:9. "My grace is sufficient
for thee: for my strength is made perfect in
I your] weakness." Perhaps this pattern of
contraries (to use the author's favorite phrase)
is best illustrated in his chapter. "The Tradition of Grace"; herein he offers an illuminating exposition of John Donne's metaphysical poem , Good Friday, 1613, Riding Westward.
Professor Halewood shows that both the
Reformation and Puritan poets share in the
Reformation view of redemption as a miracle
of grace in which God's mercy extends itself
in love to cover human dereliction. Halewood
focuses on the clashing opposites and sudden
reconciliations in the poetry as literary affirmations of the Reformation doctrine of
man's willful opposition to the eternal will
of God ; God's disinclination to prefer the
virtuous to the sinful; and the energy of
contradiction required of divine benevolence.
Separate chapters provide detailed readings
of additional poems by Donne, Herbert,
Marvell, Vaughan, and Milton - all with
a new appreciation of the Augustinian attitude concerning grace and the self. The
books final chapter is devoted solely to Paradise Lost and is a potent climax to the whole
work. The sum of the book is perceptive and
winsome literary criticism of those poems
which affirmed grace in the seventeenth
century and do so even unto this day .
What pride, ambition, and self-assertion
put apart, however, love can put back
together. Thus God and man merge through
divine love in the person of Christ. .. And
the blessedness of the paradise within
is achieved by Man's suppression of self
.in social love. ( p. 164)
I know of few places in literature where the
notes of Christian humanism sound more
clearly. and Halewood helps us immeasurably
to hear them again.
HERBERT H . UMBACH

THEOD JRE M. LUDWIG

Worth Noting

LITURGY AND LITERATURE: SELECTED ESSAYS. By Allen Cabaniss .
University of Alabama Press, 1970. $6 .00 .
POETRY OF GRACE: REFORMATION
THEMES AND STRUCTURES IN ENGLISH SEVENTEENTH CENTURY POETRY. By William H . Halewood. New
Haven : Yale University Press, 1970. $7 .50 .
Here are two short, recent, notable books
on the relations of 1i terature and religion.
Liturgy and Literature consists of reprints
of some of Professor Cabaniss's short articles from learned journals. I like the modesty
of the presentation of his research . Consider,
for instance, this statement in discussing
"Shakespeare and f the Possible Influence
of] the Holy Rosary":
Once the possibility of an association
between Shakespeare's sonnets and part
of the liturgy or a derivitive of it arises,
an inittial inspection reveals a certain'
resemblance between the structure of
the poems and the Holy Rosary. From
mid-sixteenth century onward the Rosary
has consisted of one hundred and fiftythree Hail Marys divided into fifteen
groups of ten and one of three, each group
now introduced by Our Father and concluded by Gloria Patri. It is quite impressive therefore to observe that there are
one hundred and fifty-four sonnets in the
Shakespearean sequence, the last two
being variants of the same theme. A second
datum of some importance is the prominence of the word mse in the sonnets.
(pp. 122-123)
Soon afterwards the writer asserts : "These
two rather obvious points, however. prove
nothing; they merely emphasize the suspicion
that requires still further inquiry." And he
procedes in that inquiry as modestly in the
rest of his intriguing essay.
Some other hturg'lcal motifs discussed are
"Christmas Echoes at Paschaltide"; "AI-
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William H. Halewood's The Poetry of
Grace is a sensitive and sensible analysis of
Reformation themes and structures in seventeenth century literature. Slow in starting,
with both a Preface and an Introduction to
sets its stage, the literary tempo accelerates
after the first major chapter sharply focuses
upon the fluctuations - opposition and reconciliation - of emotion and reason in
the literature, especially the poetry , of that
epoch .
Man's determination to go one way is
negated by God's determination that he
shall go another, and the decisiveness in
the poems of God 's determination is a
dramatization of his reconciling power.
This point is not contradicted by the vigor
of human assertiveness in the poems,
which discovers itself in the end to be both
doctrinally justified and a necessity of
dialectic strategy. The assertion, the almost
antic busyness of human will. gives a
challenge to the divine power to bring
quiet. . .. and the power to bring quiet
manifests itself in response. The end of
Herbert's poem The Collar is perhaps
the clearest possible example: 'Me thoughts
I sic) I heard one calling, Child!/ And I
reply 'd , My Lord.' (p. 24)
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The Visual Arts

Overexposed or Underdeveloped?
IIICHAIID H. W. •IIAOitl

By MAXINE MITCHELL

In the past few years, apparently, I've been overexposed to the art of the 60's and 70's at museums and
galleries throughout the country - in New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Mendocino, Chicago, Denver,
Kansas City, Santa Fe, Taos, and most recently, at the
opening of the new Walker Art Center in Minneapolis.
I realized this overexposure right away when I viewed
the show put together by my friendly, local museum
director, Richard Gregg, and his staff of the Joslyn Art
Museum in Omaha. It was "The Thirties Decade: American Artists and their European Contemporaries."
As I sauntered leisurely through this exhibit, I discovered, to my horror, that I'm a throwback to another
decade. There I stood in my contemporary jumpsuit
and my luggage lizagators, peering through my granny
glasses, and realized that I didn't belong to the 70's at
all. Not even to the 60's. But to the 30's. The 30's, my
spiritual home!
When I visit the galleries, l'J!l accustomed to ~aving
·t he contemporary art work do something other than
just hang there on the wall or sit there on the floor, as
these works from the 30's were doing. Art works of the
60's and 70's vie with one another for my attention.
Quite often they twirl, whirl, whiz, whir, wheeze, spin,
spit, beep, bang, or go bump in the night.
Sometimes the works invite me to become actively
involved with them. Most recently, at the Walker, I
found myself racing frantically under a canopy of light
bulbs, skipping the light famastic on wires embedded
in the floor, all the while keeping one eye on the canopy
to catch the pattern of the blinking lights. If it hadn't
been for my extraordinary sense of balance, I'd have
managed to get my luggage lizagators and my granny
glasses hopelessly entangled. Then there are others
that beckon me to come on inside their womblike selves.
Then when I'm feeling all cozy and warm, they forthwith abort me. Or they invite me to peer into an opening inside of themselves, and instead of seeing them, I
see me gawking out at me.
The art that I've experienced of the 60's and 70's is
frenetic - its canvases, sculpture, watercolors, etc. are
oversize, overstated, hysterical, distorted, disturl>ed,
schizophrenic. Like our contemporary society. So I
have no quarrel with the artists. I think they've done a
very good job. They have captured our world and have
tried to stuff it into a museum. That it does not fit into
the more human proportions of most museum build-
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ings, is not their fault. Their realization of and comment
upon our age has been so successful that there are times,
as I stroll through the galleries, that I must grab hold of
a wall to steady myself and gain reassurance that I am,
indeed, in the protected environment of a museum or
gallery, not in the factory district, nor the tenderloin
district, nor even out on the noisy street where I may be
run down at any moment by taxi or motorcycle.
Because these artists have captured and commented
upon contemporary society so well, I do not like their
work. I did not like the 60's, and as far as the ·70's have
gone, I'm not feeling exactly warm and cozy in them,
either. I feel aborted and alienated. This is not to say
that I'm unsympathetic with the social protest of these
artists. Generally I am. It's just that I realized, as I
said, to my horror, that intellectually I belong to the
70's, emotionally to the 30's.
I had been viewing "The Thirties Decade" for an hour
when the realization seeped through to the surface of
my consciousness of what a tranquil, serene experience
I was having. The canvases were not huge nor twisted
into grotesque shapes, nor did the sculptures bop me on
the head or beep at me as I walked by. They just hung
or sat there calmly, benignly, waiting for me to discover
them. I was free to look and consider as I chose. I was
in no way bombarded or intimidated.
Most of the art that I considered that day - works by
Benton, Curry, Wood, Davis, Hopper, O'Keeffe, Shahn,
Calder, Braque, Miro, Mondrian, Picasso, Kandinsky,
Klee - I hag some understanding of. Not that I sure
what Kandinsky, Klee and Miro were up to, always.
Nor do I have any real understanding of what Mondrian
meant when he stated that everything that needs to be
said can be said with the flat surface and the straight
line. But, emotionally, I can even relate in some fashion
to these three exceptions. I feel comfortable in their
presence - their dimensions are Mnman.
I paused and sighed. But as I crept back into the 70's,
I promised to treat myself to one indiscretion, at least,
when next I find myself in a gallery viewing a contemporary exhibit. When I'm accosted by a work of art, as
I surely shall be, I shall give it/her/him a most unladylike kick in the shins.
Maxine Mitchell is on the faculty of Midland Lutheran College, Fremont, Nebraska, in the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies. Her
stories for children have been used on national ETV and published in
Highlights for Children, Jack and Jill, Presbyterian Life and other
magazines . At home in Nickerson , Nebraska, Mrs . Mitchell is rearing
"one boy, a German shepherd, and a Siamese cat."
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Grant Wood , American Gothic, 1930 .
Oil on Beaver Board, 30 x 2 5 ".
Collection of The Friends of American Art
Photograph : Courtesy of The Art Institute of Chicago
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The Theatre

An Uncomfortable Ring of Nowness
-------------------------------------------------------------------------By WALTER SORELL

The question of the longevity of plays has always
puzzled me.
Tragedy is weightier than comedy, of course, but
comedy also endures. The long shadows of the giants
of tragedy like Shakespeare, Sophocles, and Euripedes
may give the impression that only tragedies survive
their own times. But Aristophanes does not do badly
today, and Moliere towers over Corneille and Racine.
George Lillo's (l693-1739) Merchant of London was a
turning point in the development of the theatre and
ushered in the bourgeois drama; so we were taught and
so we are teaching. But Lillo's play is buried in history
books while John Gay's (1685-1732) Beggar's Opera is
still most enjoyable in performance.
The Chelsea Theatre put on a new and delectable
production of this satire on a period in history full of
corruption and robbery. It has an uncomfortable ring
of nowness. The justification for doing Gay's play today
lies in its unfortunate timelessness as Bertolt Brecht
and Kurt Weill well understood in the twenties. The
Sir Robert Walpoles are still very much alive in Washington, and the Peachums - he may now be disguised
as a corporation lawyer - in the lobbies of that city
are not to be pooh-poohed.
The ballads of the Beggars Opera are fully realized
again in their recreation by Ryan Edwards. the original, early eighteenth century satire against the Neapolitan school of opera is of course no longer of interest, but the Hogarthian scene makes up for it with its
fun. Gene Lesser stages this play as if he had experienced
the London of those days - when in fact he had only
the advantage of studying contemporary New York
City where mugger Macheath still knows how to get
away with murder.
Michael Weller's Moonchildren were launched at
London's Royal Court and headed toward New York
via the Washington Arena Stage. The play landed on
Broadway and died after sixteen performances. Weller
is about thirty years old and a very gifted, yet not quite
mature, dramatist. The scene of his play is an attic near
an American university, where five boys and two girls
share the apartment. In spite of the humorous undercurrent, the play shows the tragedy of our youth, their
inability to understand what is happening to all of us
and to them in particular. They are unable to accept
reality as real. They try to beat reality by playing roles
of their own invention and creating their own meaning
for meaninglessness.
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The dramatis personae are an amalgam of characters
the author must have known, and therefore the play
has all the earmarks of an autobiography. He experienced the very same situation he wrote about, having
lived with young people who did not understand one
another. They don't in the play either. Whatever one
person does baffles the other. The author admitted in
a New York Times interview that he is still baffled by
the characters too and "the play is perhaps a description of a puzzle."
There's the rub. The weakness of the play lies in the
author's lack of aesthetic distance. One cannot dramatize the "description of a puzzle," especially not by pretended and protracted improvisation. The playwright
who would look life in the eye, eyeball to eyeball, better get his distance first. Then he is better fitted to sharpen the focus and to know exactly how to interpret wha:t
he sees.
I never thought highly of Clifford Odets' The Country
Girl. It was an old-fashioned play in 1950 when it was
new. The only thing that has changed twenty years
later is our desperate nostalgic feeling for everything
that once was. That's also the situation in the play: a
drunken actor, who lengthened his lost weekend into
lost years, is trying to make a comeback.
The play has good parts and is adroitly cast. Jason
Robards is familiar with down-and-out characters by
now and does the role of the actor famously. George
Grizzard is splendid as the young, cock-sure director
who isn't really quite so sure of himself. Maureen Stapleton as the country girl and wife of the actor performs
her part with great intelligence and all the right nuances.
John Houseman stages the play as a vehicle for the
actors, and Douglas Schmidt mounted a set which expresses the mood of the play and its desperate characters.
Yet, after the audience lofted its last bravo, I could
not help feeling a kind of void. It was that letdown you
experience when you have faced impressive mediocrity, brilliance over really nothing, a commonplace
situation with a bit of melodrama, a touch of vulgarity,
and a dash of obvious cleverness. Odets may have had
too much feeling and not enough poetry. I know that
the heart of the matter is always a matter of the heart.
But more than the heart is needed to make a play, and
heart-beats alone are not poetry. Between the beats
there must be a bit of mystery, the makings of a dream,
something to wonder about when the heart is quiet.
They're all there in this play, and yet they aren't.
The Cresset

Urban Affairs

The Organization Man
---------------------------------------------------------------------------ByJOHNKRETZMANN

"Don't analyse - Organize!" So goes one of the informal "rules for radicals" which continue to emanate
from the old high priest of organizing, Saul Alinksy.
To trace Alinsky's career over the last four decades
is to touch on most of the major social issues which have
bedeviled our cities, and indeed the nation as a whole,
during that time. From his earliest experience in trade
union organizing, Alinsky has attempted various strategies, with varying degrees of success - all of them aimed
at gaining political, economic, and social leverage for
groups of people with little or no "clout" to begin with.
From the late thirties through the fifties, Alinsky
concentrated his organizing talents in working class·
communities. Beginning with his first turf-based , neighborhood organization - the Back of the Yards Council
in Chicago's packinghouse district - Alinsky remained
basically true to the labor movement's constituency.
But beginning in the late fifties in city after city across
the north, the community organizing movement emerged
as the urban response to the essentially rural southern
civil rights movement. The Woodlawn Organization,
set in the heart of South Side Chicago, became the prototype for literally dozens of Alinsky-style community
organizations in the black inner-city.
Throughout these efforts, it has been a major tenet
of Alinsky-style organizers that one's aim is to work
oneself out of a job. That is, an organizer's task is to uncover and encourage the emergence of indigenous leadership. An organizer is emphatically not a small-time
empire-builder.
As a direct result of this policy, we are blessed (or
cursed, depending on your stake in the status quo) with
a large and still growing number of immensely talented
and increasingly self-confident local community leaders
in our cities.
In addition, Alinsky himself has trained literally
hundreds of disciples in the tactics and strategies of
organizing. \fany of these trainees, like Cesar Chavez
and Nicholas von Hoffman, have moved out to establish
solid reputations of their own.
With all this behind him, and with old age creeping
up, can there be anything ahead for Saul Alinsky?
Yes, indeed. In the last three years, the "old fox" has
embarked on an entirely new strategy. This new course,
which has drawn criticisms from both the left and right,
points to the middle class as the major constituency for
Alinsky-style organizing.
This emphasis on the American middle class as a
catalyst for social amelioration is not, to say the least,
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a very orthodox view among those interested in social
change. Sure, Charles Reich and others have pointed
to some basic questioning of values going on in middle
America, but few who are very hard-nosed about how
change happens have taken Reich very seriously.
So why does Alinsky, who has shown himself to be
nothing if not pragmatic, suddenly place his hope and
his organizing abilities at the doorstep of the one group
of people who are supposedly the most self-satisfied and
politically complacent in all the land? The answer is,
of course, that Alinsky doesn't think the vast middle
class is all that quiescent. The middle America Alinsky
sees is on that is squeezed financially by inflation and
rising taxes; one that is reacting against paying the
price, in lives and money, for the country's high-handed
foreign policy; one that is increasingly upset with shoddy corporate products and services and with corporate
shyster advertisers; one that is tired of watching industry
foul the air they breathe and the water they drink.
This is the stuff of which organizations are made.
Articulate the grievances, transform them into public
issues, organize support around various tactical approaches and presto - a network of middle America
advocate groups appear who are ready and able to do
battle with those who hold political and economic power.
This is the current Alinsky game plan. It has its parallels in numerous other manifestations of middle class
unrest, including Naderism, the consumer movement,
the revolt against new taxes, the successes across the
country of independent politics, and even the respectable showings of the Georges, Wallace and McGovern.
As a long-range strategy for significant social change,
however, the emphasis on middle class organizing has
its drawbacks. The principal one involves the temptation to divert attention away from the seemingly intractable problem areas of racism and poverty. Much
as we would like to sweep these back under a carpet of
benign neglect, they simply will not disappear. Unless
Alinsky's burgeoning new middle class constituency
can begin to make contact with groups in the poverty
neighborhoods and regions, and begin to define together issues where the self-interest of the middle class
and the poor do in fact coincide, then what we are witnessing is simply one vast series of distractions.
One's hope is that Alinsky and his organizers, as well
as those involved in other movements with a middle
class base, can keep in mind their even greater responsibility to America's have-nots.
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Orthodoxy vs. Fundamentalism
The Ehlen case at Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, has
demonstrated once again how close liberalism and fundamentalism are to each other and how radically both
differ from orthodoxy.
Liberalism refuses to take seriously the Scriptures of
the Old and the New Testament as the Word of God.
Thoroughgoing Liberals tend, as a matter of fact, to be
somewhat embarrassed by the whole idea of a written
revelation which can speak an authoritative "Thus
saith the Lord." So the Scriptures become a kind of
record of man's spiritual adventure, the story of his
quest for the divine, rather than the record of God's
disclosure of Himself to man. The Liberal has, and can
afford to have, a completely open mind on the question
of the Scriptures as literature; nothing ultimate depends
on his reading of a particular Scriptural passage because
the writings of Gandhi or Martin Luther King, Jr. or
Albert Schweitzer or any other noble soul of the present
are as "inspired" as those of David or Isaiah or Matthew or Paul.
Fundamentalism refuses to take seriously the Scriptures of the Old and the New Testament as the Word of
God. The remarkable set of theological guidelines issued by Dr. J .A.O. Preus several weeks ago for sniffing
out heresy in The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
may or may not leave any scope for serious theological
work within the church; they certainly leave no place
for any kind of responsible literary criticism of the
sources which God has given man for understanding
His mind and will. These guidelines have about them a
literalistic simplicism which is much more Mormon
than Lutheran in tone and character. And this is characteristic of fundamentalism , for the fundamentalist is
unable or unwilling to believe that God would choose
to reveal Himself in ordinary words which, by their
very nature, admit of variant readings, actually change
meaning over periods of time, mean one thing in one
literary form and something quite else in another literary form, and may pass through many minds and hands
before they finally achieve a kind of documentary stability in one text.
Against both the liberal and the fundamentalist, orthodoxy asserts, as a declaration of faith that the Scriptures
of the Old and the New Testament are the Word of God .
As words they come to us in all of the contingencies of
words. They are capable of many kinds and levels of
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meaning. They have ancestries, some of which are fairly
easy for the scholar to trace, others of which are still
unclear. And as the Word of God , they participate in
the nature of Him Who made them and Who chooses to
use them, i.e., they conceal at the same time they disclose, they are the wisdom of God to the man of faith
and they are foolishness to the man of unfaith.
The present struggle within the Lutheran ChurchMissouri Synod is a struggle between orthodoxy and
fundamentalism. Dr. Preus, at least as far as he may
be judged from his public utterances, is a fundamentalist. And let it be said also that, like many fundamentalists, he has a record of quick and total compliance with his understanding of the will of God as he
reads it in the Scriptures. In our present distress at his
bull-in-a-china-shop treatment of the Seminary, we may
forget that years ago, when many other leaders of the
church were pussy-footing on the race issue, Dr. Preus
took a bold and Scriptural stand for which many of us
had reason to be very grateful. But, of course, past truth
is no guarantee of present truth, as witness the behavior
of St. Peter at Antioch where it became necessary for
St. Paul to withstand him to the face .
What the outcome will be is, at this time, hard to say.
Fundamentalism, like liberalism, is a kind of theological
reductionism and therefore mightily attractive to the kind
of lay mind which is content to be told what to believe
without being required to do any genuine searching of
the Scriptures itself. Unquestionably Dr. Preus speaks for
theoverwhelmingmajorityofthoseclergy and laity in the
church who are fundamentalists . It is not inconceivable
that The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod will go the
way of the Southern Baptists and other fundamentalist
sects with whom, as a matter of fact, many of our leaders
and people have felt more at home than with brethren
of our own theological tradition. In that case anxious
warnings about the danger of the Seminary losing its
accreditation can hardly affect the outcome seriously.
Nor should they. For what is at stake far transcends
questions of institutional accreditment.
What is at stake is the soul of The Lutheran ChurchMissouri Synod. On that Dr. Preus is clear and right.
And the battle will not be fairly joined until we who
oppose him accept battle on the field of theology rather
than that of institutional politics.
The Cresset

